An investigation of the effects of normal aging on reasoning ability : A dual-process approach by Prowse Turner, Jamie
  
 
 
 
 
AN INVESTIGATION OF THE EFFECTS OF NORMAL AGING ON REASONING 
ABILITY: A DUAL-PROCESS APPROACH 
 
A Thesis Submitted to  
the College of Graduate Studies and Research 
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements 
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
in the Department of Psychology 
University of Saskatchewan 
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan 
 
by 
Jamie Alyson Prowse Turner 
 
 
 
© Copyright Jamie A. Prowse Turner, December 2012. All rights reserved. 
 
i 
 
PERMISSION TO USE 
 
In presenting this thesis/dissertation in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Postgraduate 
degree from the University of Saskatchewan, I agree that the Libraries of this University may 
make it freely available for inspection. I further agree that permission for copying of this 
thesis/dissertation in any manner, in whole or in part, for scholarly purposes may be granted by 
the professor or professors who supervised my thesis/dissertation work or, in their absence, by 
the Head of the Department or the Dean of the College in which my thesis work was done. It is 
understood that any copying or publication or use of this thesis/dissertation or parts thereof for 
financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. It is also understood that due 
recognition shall be given to me and to the University of Saskatchewan in any scholarly use 
which may be made of any material in my thesis/dissertation.  
 
Requests for permission to copy or to make other uses of materials in this thesis/dissertation in 
whole or part should be addressed to:  
 
Head of the Department of Psychology  
University of Saskatchewan  
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, Canada, S7N 5A5  
 
OR  
 
Dean  
College of Graduate Studies and Research  
University of Saskatchewan  
107 Administration Place  
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, Canada, S7N 5A2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
Abstract 
 Research has provided a great deal of evidence that reasoning performance declines with 
age (De Neys & Van Gelder, 2009; Fisk & Sharp, 2002; Gilinsky & Judd, 1994; Salthouse, 
2005). Understanding these age-related differences is important because reasoning is an integral 
part of everyday cognitive functioning, the decline of which may result in older adults relying on 
heuristic strategies that can result in bias (Bacon, Handley, & Newstead, 2003). The objective of 
the current research was to use a dual-process theory framework to explain why there are age-
related differences in reasoning. In addition to a variety of reasoning tests (i.e., a syllogistic task, 
base rate task, and the Cognitive Reflection Test), the present dissertation included independent 
tests of capacity (working memory, processing speed, and inhibition) and thinking styles to 
account for these age-related differences.  
 Chapter 2 focused on two recently proposed levels of Type 2 analytic thinking, 
algorithmic (individual differences in capacity) and reflective (individual differences in rational 
thinking dispositions) (Stanovich, 2009). It was hypothesized that a) both reasoning performance 
and capacity performance would differ with age, b) these components would contribute 
independently to performance on three reasoning tasks, and c) that they would explain at least 
some of the age-related differences in reasoning performance. Older adults demonstrated lower 
algorithmic capacity relative to younger adults and measures of capacity were related to 
performance on all three tasks. Furthermore, capacity attenuated the age-related differences in 
reasoning. Older adults also demonstrated a lower score than young adults on the measure of 
thinking dispositions; however, this predicted age-related differences only on the base rate task 
(and marginally on the syllogistic task). Furthermore, on the syllogistic reasoning task, a belief-
bias component of reasoning was related to the age-related differences in reasoning.   
 Chapter 3 focused on whether the performance differences between young and older 
adults demonstrated in Chapter 2 could be attributed to differences in metacognitive skills. Four 
aspects of metacognition were examined: 1) differences in conflict detection, 2) confidence in 
individual answers, 3) confidence in overall performance, and 4) scores on the self-report 
measure Metamemory in Adulthood.  There was little evidence to suggest that there were 
difference in metacognitive ability between young and older adults, thus the results were not 
consistent with the hypothesis that metacognition plays a role in the age-related reasoning 
iii 
 
differences. In Chapter 3, I also investigated the hypothesis that conclusion believability and 
latency may be cues to confidence, and that perceived difficulty of the task may be an alternate 
measure of confidence, that is related to performance and response time. The data reveal that the 
conclusion believability and latency cues were important predictors of confidence, especially for 
the older adults, and that perceived task difficulty was related to performance and latency on 
both the syllogistic and base rate tasks.  
 Chapter 4 focused on the effects of perspective instructions on age-related differences in 
reasoning. In particular, I investigated whether reasoners would engage in a more logical, 
analytic style of thinking when prompted to reason from an alternative perspective. Results 
indicated that a shift in perspective may be advantageous for the older adults. This is promising 
because although older adults’ limited capacity increases reliance on heuristic output and 
decreases processing power, there may be a straightforward way to mediate these age-related 
differences in reasoning ability, simply by asking them to reason from another’s perspective.  
 Overall, this research significantly expanded the current knowledge regarding age-related 
differences in reasoning. Moreover, the findings were consistent with a dual-process theory of 
reasoning, which provided an integrative framework that accounts for the patterns of findings 
presented in this dissertation.  
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Chapter 1 
General Introduction 
It is well documented that there are age-related differences in reasoning ability measured 
by normative standards (Fisk & Sharp, 2002; Gilinsky & Judd, 1994; Salthouse, 2005). 
Specifically, the ability to resolve conflict between logic and belief is known to decline sharply 
with age (De Neys & Van Gelder, 2009). This difference is often reflected in older adults 
providing more responses based on prior knowledge, opinion, and belief, rather than logic or 
rules, limiting their ability to reason objectively (Klaczynski & Robinson, 2000). Traditional 
approaches in this field focus on cognitive capacity to explain age-related reasoning differences 
(Fisk & Sharp, 2002; Salthouse, 2005); however, this is only one of several factors proposed by 
dual-process researchers to have an impact on reasoning performance (e.g., thinking style) 
(Evans, 2010; Stanovich, 2009; Thompson, 2009, 2010). The purpose of this thesis was to build 
a comprehensive view of age-related differences in reasoning.  Specifically, the focus of this 
dissertation was to examine four possible junctures (i.e., capacity, thinking style, metacognitive 
ability, and strategy choice) where these factors could account for the age-related differences in 
reasoning. Detailed theoretical and empirical background relevant to each chapter is provided 
below; the focus is on developing the large theoretical context. Additional chapter-specific issues 
are developed in Chapter 3 and 4. A brief overview of Chapters 3 and 4 is also provided here.  
 
1.1.Dual-Process Theory 
 Dual-process theories (DPTs) of reasoning propose two qualitatively different types of 
processes that underlie reasoning: Type 1 and Type 2 (see Evans and Frankish, 2009 for review; 
Stanovich, 2009).  Type 1 (heuristic) processes are automatic, rely on experience, and produce 
highly contextual representations that give rise to intuitive judgements.  In contrast, the Type 2 
processes (analytic), reflect slower, controlled processing, and are serial and rule-based. 
Recently, Type 2 processes have been divided into two independent components – the reflective 
and algorithmic levels (Stanovich, 2009). The algorithmic level is argued to be a measure of 
individual differences in fluid intelligence, which includes, but is not limited to, differences in 
working memory, processing speed, and inhibition. Stanovich (2009) argues that the differences 
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in the reflective mind can be measured by individual differences in thinking dispositions, which 
are predispositions to engage in logical, Type 2 thinking (Kokis, Macpherson, Toplak, West, & 
Stanovich, 2002; Macpherson & Stanovich, 2007; Sá, West, & Stanovich, 1999; Stanovich, 
1999; 2004; 2011; Stanovich & West, 1997; 1998). On this view, Type 1 processes dominate 
unless something happens to cue intervention by Type 2 processes. Indeed, the reflective level is 
argued to trigger the override (i.e., intervention and overturning of the initial intuitive response 
by T2 processes) of Type 1 processing and the likelihood of a successful override is dependent 
on the capacity based, algorithmic level. There are instances where Type 1 processes can result 
in an appropriate response (e.g., when there is no conflict between belief and logic); however, 
the judgements derived from Type 1 processes are seldom re-evaluated by Type 2 processes 
(Thompson, 2009). In the few cases where re-evaluation occurs, it is not guaranteed that an 
alternative response will be produced (Evans, 2010; Stanovich, 2011; Stanovich & West, 2000; 
Thompson, 2009).  
Overriding an erroneous Type 1, intuitive response can be difficult because these types of 
responses are subjectively appealing, feel intuitively correct, and support prior beliefs, opinions, 
and knowledge (Epstein, 1994; Klaczynski & Robinson, 2000; Thompson, 2009, 2010). This is 
especially problematic for reasoning problems that pit intuition against logic (i.e., conflict 
problems), where the participant is strongly cued to respond intuitively, but the intuitive response 
conflicts with the logical response (De Neys & Van Gelder, 2009). In other words, when the 
Type 1 output disagrees with logical analysis provided by Type 2 processes, individuals have 
more difficulty than when the two systems output similar responses. Consider the following 
example taken from our stimulus set: 
 
No addictive things are ramadions 
Some cigarettes are ramadions 
Therefore, some cigarettes are not addictive things 
YES / NO 
 
This problem strongly cues the response NO because this conclusion is not believable; 
however, the response based on the logical validity of the conclusion is YES, consequently 
producing a conflict between logic and belief.  
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Resolving such conflict is even more challenging for older adults (De Neys & Van 
Gelder, 2009; Gilinsky & Judd, 1994). In fact, when older and younger adults’ performance on 
conflict problems is compared, older adults provide more intuitive responses than younger 
adults; however, when there is no conflict (i.e., the two systems produce the same response), 
older adults perform on par with younger adults. In other words, older adults are at a significant 
disadvantage when faced with problems where they need to separate logic and intuition (De 
Neys & Van Gelder, 2009; Gilinsky & Judd, 1994).  
Although there is evidence to suggest that capacity based declines (i.e., working memory 
and processing speed) explain the age-related difficulty in overriding the intuitively cued 
response on conflict problems (Fisk & Sharp, 2002; Gilinsky & Judd, 1994; Salthouse, 2005), 
these studies do not always directly measure whether these variables attenuate the age-related 
differences in reasoning. In addition, there are other issues that need to be addressed, including 
the limited measures of reasoning utilized previously, inconsistencies in the literature, and 
alternative factors that have been proposed to explain the age-related differences. 
Although Salthouse intended to measure reasoning performance across a multitude of 
tasks, many of the reasoning tasks examined were taken from intelligence tests (e.g., Wechsler 
test battery) (Salthouse, 2005), which often do not test the ability to override an initial 
compelling response, a critical component of reasoning ability (Stanovich, 2011). Furthermore, 
the studies that have utilized tasks of this nature (Fisk & Sharp, 2002; Gilinsky & Judd, 1994) 
have been restricted to a single task, namely syllogistic reasoning. One goal of the current 
research was to investigate the relationship between age and reasoning performance in multiple 
tasks, including a syllogistic task, designed to test the ability to override an intuitive response.  
An additional goal of the current study was to examine inconsistencies in the literature 
regarding working memory and processing speed. Fisk and Sharp (2002) have indicated that the 
relationship between working memory and age-related variance (Gilinsky & Judd, 1994), is 
attributed to a slowing in processing speed. In contrast, Salthouse (2005) argued that differences 
between young and older adults cannot be solely attributed to slower processing in older adults 
because these differences are found in situations when there are no time constraints. To resolve 
this discrepancy, working memory and processing speed were measured to determine if one or 
both of these factors attenuate age-related variance in reasoning, in untimed reasoning tasks.  
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Although researchers tend to focus on the capacity part of the algorithmic level, there is a 
reflective, goal driven process that is also important in the success of overriding intuitive 
responses (Stanovich, 2009).  In fact, Stanovich argues that reasoning ability is related to the 
disposition to trigger override of Type 1 output and the ability to engage Type 2 processing to 
further examine the Type 1 response. Evidence for the role of the reflective level stems from 
research that demonstrates thinking dispositions (a measure of reflective processes) predict 
variance in reasoning after the algorithmic effects are partialled out (Kokis, Macpherson, Toplak, 
West, & Stanovich, 2002; Stanovich, 2009; Stanovich & West, 1997; Toplak, West & Stanovich, 
2011; West, Toplak, & Stanovich, 2008). By extension, we predicted that individual differences 
in both the capacity of the algorithmic mind and in the goals and preferences of the reflective 
mind would be related to age-related differences in reasoning ability. 
 
1.2. Reasoning Tasks 
In order to measure reasoning ability, we utilized three reasoning tasks: an evaluation 
syllogistic reasoning task (refer to Appendix A), a base rate task (refer to Appendix B for 
examples), and the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005) (refer to Appendix C). The 
syllogistic task, which we adapted from Shynkaruk and Thompson (2006), requires participants 
to judge the validity of a conclusion following from two premises. The base rate task, adapted 
from De Neys and Glumicic (2008), requires participants to indicate the likelihood that the 
stereotypical description of an individual belongs to one of two categories. Both tasks include 
conflict, no-conflict, and neutral problems. The inclusion of neutral problems provides a baseline 
condition in which there is no conflict. Given that there is no default intuitive response for the 
neutral problems, it will be necessary for participants to engage Type 2, analytic processing to 
solve the problems. Neutral problems are often included in studies with younger adults (e.g., De 
Neys & Glumicic, 2008), but are rarely included in studies with older adults. Inclusion of neutral 
baseline problems will potentially facilitate understanding of age-related differences.  
According to dual-process theory and prior research, performance should be lower when 
Type 2 processing is required to overcome Type 1 outputs (conflict) than in situations where 
both the Type 1 and 2 outputs are identical (no-conflict) (e.g., De Neys & Van Gelder, 2009). 
Also, because Type 2, analytic processing is believed to decline with age, this difference should 
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be greater in older adults. In other words, we anticipated that performance would decrease on the 
conflict and neutral problems relative to no-conflict problems, because Type 2 processing is 
required for these problems. Furthermore, this should occur for both age groups, with older 
adults showing a greater impairment.  
The third task we utilized, the CRT (Frederick, 2005), was intended to measure the 
ability to override an erroneous intuitive response in favour of analytic engagement that can lead 
to the correct response. The following is one of the three items from the CRT. 
 
A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs a dollar more than the ball.  
How much does the ball cost?    ____ cents 
 
This task consists solely of conflict problems and it is not possible to solve these 
problems without inhibiting the initial compelling response (i.e., 5 cents for the above problem) 
and engaging in Type 2 processing. Consistent with predictions for the other two tasks, it was 
expected that young adults would outperform older adults. 
 
1.3. Algorithmic Processes 
 Dual-process theory predicts two different findings stemming from limits to cognitive 
capacity in the algorithmic level (Stanovich, 1999, 2011). First, capacity should explain age 
related changes in reasoning performance and a difference in capacity should be reflected in a 
reliance on heuristic processing. Thus, on conflict problems, reasoners with a lower capacity 
should show a greater tendency to select heuristically cued responses (i.e., belief- and stereotype-
based) relative to those with higher capacities. Furthermore, performance on no-conflict 
problems should not be related to capacity, because the Type 1 and Type 2 outputs are identical. 
Second, because performance on neutral problems is dependent on the ability to engage Type 2 
processes, and because lower capacity leads to less processing power, those with lower capacity 
should struggle when reasoning with neutral problems. The present study aimed to provide a 
comprehensive account of capacity related variables that have yet to be examined in this context.  
 We used four measures to assess cognitive capacity. First, to assess verbal ability we used 
the vocabulary subtest portion of the Wide Range Achievement Test, 4
th
 Edition (WRAT4) 
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(Wilkinson & Robertson, 2006).  Prior research has demonstrated that vocabulary is a good 
index of crystallized intelligence (Klaczynski & Robinson, 2000) and has been found to be 
related to quality of reasoning (Gilinsky & Judd, 1994; Klaczynski, 1997; Klaczynski & 
Robinson, 2000), thus it was important that we match our two age groups on verbal ability to 
ensure that this was not a confound in the current research.  
The other three factors measured were working memory, processing speed, and 
inhibition, which are correlated but conceptually distinct measures (Salthouse, 2005). Research 
has indicated that these factors are related to reasoning ability (e.g., De Neys & Van Gelder, 
2009; Fisk & Sharp; 2002; Gilinsky & Judd, 1994; Stanovich, 2011), however it is not clear 
whether these factors independently attenuate age-related differences in reasoning. Following 
from this, if cognitive capacity can explain age-related variance in reasoning, then individuals 
higher in working memory capacity, inhibitory control, and processing speed should be better 
able to engage in Type 2 thinking and override intuitive responses. The following paragraphs lay 
out the predictions in more detail. 
1.3.1. Working Memory Capacity. Many reasoning tasks require the maintenance of 
information prior to it being operated upon (Salthouse, 2005); consequently, it is not surprising 
that individuals with a greater working memory capacity exhibit greater reasoning ability than 
those with a lower capacity (Capon, Handley, & Dennis, 2003; De Neys & Verschueren, 2006; 
Kokis et al., 2002; Kyllonen & Christal, 1990; Markovits, Doyon, & Simoneau, 2002; Quayle & 
Ball, 2000). It has also been argued that age-related difficulties in reasoning are mediated by 
differences in working memory capacity (Gilinsky & Judd, 1994; Salthouse, 2005). However, 
recent research has suggested that it might not be working memory capacity per se, but a 
correlated construct, namely processing speed or inhibition, that is responsible for the difference 
(e.g., De Beni, Palladino, Pazzaglia, & Cornoldi, 1998; Fisk & Sharp, 2002; Salthouse, 1991; 
2000). Additional algorithmic abilities, including processing speed and inhibitory control, may 
also play an important role by either directly affecting reasoning ability (Fisk & Sharp, 2002) or 
by indirectly affecting working memory (De Beni et al., 1998). Thus, one goal of the present 
research was to determine if working memory predicts age-related variance in reasoning 
performance when additional capacity factors are included. 
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In the present study, working memory capacity was measured by performance on the List 
Span Task (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; De Beni et al., 1998). Given our previous arguments 
that capacity should account for age-related differences on conflict problems, we predicted that 
working memory capacity would be related to ability on conflict problems, but not the no-
conflict problems. Also, we argued that neutral problems require some level of Type 2 
processing, therefore it was expected that working memory would attenuate age-related variance 
on the neutral problem responses as well. This is consistent with dual-process theorists who 
assume that Type 2 processes decline, relative to Type 1 processes, in old age (Gilinsky & Judd, 
1994). 
1.3.2. Processing Speed. A slowing of basic information-processing is another variable 
that is argued to be responsible for various age-related deficits in cognitive functioning 
(Salthouse, 1996; 2000; 2005). Contributions of processing speed fit well within the dual-process 
framework, given that processing speed has been shown to be important in the mediating 
relationship between age and cognition (Levitt, Fugelsang, Crossley, 2006; Salthouse 1996). 
However, the findings regarding the relationship between processing speed and reasoning ability 
are mixed. On one side, previous research has shown that when working memory ability is 
partialled out, the relationship between reasoning performance and working memory becomes 
non-existent and processing speed becomes the most significant predictor (Fisk & Sharp, 2002). 
This is consistent with the idea that the age-related declines in speed of processing may mediate 
working memory effects (Fisk & Sharp, 2002; Levitt et al., 2006; Salthouse, 1991; 2000; 
Salthouse & Babcock, 1991). Other researchers have suggested that the decline in processing 
speed with age has a relatively smaller influence on performance compared to working memory 
(see Salthouse, 2005 for a review). For example, there are still large accuracy differences 
between age groups when processing time is not limited, which implies that the age-related 
differences are not simply attributable to slower processing speed (Salthouse, 1994; see 
Salthouse, 2005 for review).  In an attempt to reconcile these mixed results, we examined the 
relationship between processing speed and working memory in reasoning tasks, which reasoners 
were given unlimited time to complete. 
1.3.3. Inhibition. As we age, it appears that there is a decline in the ability to utilize 
inhibitory mechanisms to control cognitive processing (Hasher, Stoltzfus, Zacks, & Rypma, 
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1991; Hasher & Zacks, 1988). Evidence for this argument is that older adults are more 
susceptible to Stroop-type interference effects compared to young adults (Troyer, Leach, & 
Strauss, 2006). Thus, another possibility is that it might not be the loss of working memory 
capacity or decrease in processing speed, per se, which is responsible for age-related differences 
in reasoning, but less efficient inhibitory mechanisms.  In fact, it has been suggested that deficits 
in working memory can be attributed to poor inhibitory mechanisms (e.g., De Beni et al., 1998). 
Specifically, differences in inhibitory ability have been attributed to a difference in attention 
resources localized in a component of working memory, the central executive (De Beni et al., 
1998; Handley et al., 2004). In this case, age-relate differences in reasoning should be attenuated 
by inhibition, but perhaps not working memory.    
Indeed, there is abundant evidence that the ability to inhibit irrelevant information is 
necessary for rational thinking (De Neys, Schaeken, & d’Ydewalle, 2005; De Neys & Van 
Gelder, 2009; Handley, Capon, Beveridge, Dennis, & Evans, 2004; Houdé, 1997; Markovits & 
Barrouillet, 2002; Markovits & Doyon, 2004; Moutier, Plagne-Caveux, Melot, & Houdé, 2006). 
Contextual information (e.g., belief) may interfere with logic and result in biased reasoning. The 
importance of inhibitory control has been highlighted in a wide range of reasoning tasks (e.g., 
deductive, inductive, conditional, and relational) (Handley et al., 2004; Houdé et al., 2000; 
Moutier, Angeard, & Houdé, 2002; Moutier & Houdé, 2003; Simoneau & Markovits, 2003). 
Research examining inhibitory control in children has demonstrated that inhibitory control was 
related to successful Type 2 thinking (Handley et al., 2004) and we sought to examine this 
possibility in older adults. Inhibition was expected to be a factor for only the conflict problems, 
because generating a T2 response requires inhibition of the strong intuitive response, whereas 
inhibition is not necessary for the no-conflict problems. There was no anticipated relationship 
between inhibition and neutral problem performance.  
1.4. Reflective Level 
In addition to the capacity of the algorithmic level, another individual difference variable 
that plays a role in reasoning ability is the reflective level or rational thinking dispositions: the 
predisposition to engage in logical analytic, Type 2 thinking (Kokis et al., 2002; Macpherson & 
Stanovich, 2007; Sá, et al., 1999; Stanovich, 1999; 2004; 2011; Stanovich & West, 1997; 1998). 
Stanovich and West (1997; 1998) proposed a measure of actively open-minded thinking to assess 
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variability in thinking dispositions. Actively open-minded thinking is defined as the willingness 
to search actively for evidence against one’s views and to fairly weigh counterevidence against 
such views (Stanovich & West, 1997; 1998; 2007); and is often measured by the Actively Open-
Minded Thinking Scale or AOT (Stanovich & West, 1997; 1998; 2007).  
Strong evidence that thinking dispositions are related to critical thinking has been found 
in young adults by Stanovich and colleagues (Stanovich and West, 1997; 1998; 2007; West et al., 
2008). They discovered that after partialling out the variance due to intelligence, measures of 
thinking dispositions (i.e., AOT) predicted unique variance in reasoning ability. The present 
research was the first study to investigate the potential role of thinking dispositions in older 
adults’ reasoning and the potential role the reflective level plays in age-related differences in 
reasoning ability. 
1.5. Summary 
In sum, the first goal in the current research was to investigate the role of the algorithmic 
and reflective levels of Type 2 processes. Thus, in Chapter 2, the focus was on the role of 
capacity constraints and thinking dispositions in age-related differences in reasoning. It was 
expected that age-related differences between these factors would explain, at least part of, the 
reasoning performance difference between young and old adults.  
In the third chapter, I investigated whether age-related differences in metacognitive 
ability could explain some of the residual variance in age-related differences in reasoning.. 
Metacognitive ability is referred to as the ability to correctly assess one’s knowledge (Hertzog & 
Hultsch, 2000; Hertzog & Robinson, 2005; Koriat, Ma’ayan, & Nussinson, 2006; Pliske & 
Mutter, 1996). Thompson (2009) has argued that metacognitive processes are commonly used to 
assess the output of the heuristic system and to determine if there is a need for analytic 
engagement. In other words, metacognitive skills often determine whether a reasoner will 
attempt Type 2 processing. To investigate whether age-related differences in reasoning can be 
explained by differences in metacognitive ability, we examined four different constructs: conflict 
detection, confidence in individual answers and overall performance, and a self-report measure 
of this ability. In addition to these measures, we examined the role of conclusion believability 
and latency as cues to confidence, and perceived task difficulty as an alternative measure of 
confidence.  
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In Chapter 4, I sought to determine the extent to which age-related reasoning differences, 
in part, reflect a failure of older adults to fully exploit available analytic resources. To test this 
hypothesis, reasoners were asked to adopt an alternative perspective while reasoning.  It has been 
proposed that shifting perspectives allows participants to differentiate between the writer’s 
intentions and their own beliefs (Thompson, Evans, & Handley, 2005).  From a dual-process 
viewpoint, having participants reason from a perspective other than their own (e.g., writer) 
requires them to engage in analytic thinking (Beatty & Thompson, 2012; Thompson et al., 2005). 
In young adults, researchers have successfully demonstrated that a perspective shift promotes an 
analytic mode of thought and reduces reliance on beliefs (Beatty & Thompson, 2012; Dias, 
Roazzi, & Harris, 2000; Greenhoot, Semb, Colombo, & Schreiber, 2004; Thompson et al., 2005). 
Therefore, in the present study we sought to determine if a perspective shift would improve 
reasoning in older adults. If age-related differences in reasoning abilities are, in part, due to a 
failure of older adults fully exploiting their analytic reasoning capacity, the perspective 
manipulation should be successful  
Overall, this dissertation examined whether four factors (i.e., capacity, thinking style, 
metacognitive ability, and strategy choice) could account for the age-related differences in 
reasoning. The current dissertation is organized in a manuscript format, with three stand alone 
manuscripts. The manuscripts stem from one extensive study comparing 72 young and 72 old 
adults and, collectively, expand our understanding of reasoning and aging under a dual-process 
theory framework. Chapters 2-4 focus on specific factors that may contribute to the age-related 
differences in reasoning. Chapter 5 provides a summary of key findings and conclusions. 
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Chapter 2 
Dual-Process Theory of Reasoning and Aging 
 
Abstract 
The ability to resolve conflict between logic and intuition, in favour of logic, is known to decline 
sharply with age (De Neys & Van Gelder, 2009; Gilinsky & Judd, 1994). Prior researchers have 
argued that capacity factors are related to age-related differences in reasoning performance (Fisk 
& Sharp, 2002; Gilinsky & Judd, 1994; Salthouse, 2005). However, the extent to which these 
factors and other potentially important factors, suggested by dual-process theories of reasoning, 
attenuate the age-related differences in reasoning has yet to be determined. Seventy-two older (M 
= 80.0 years) and 72 younger (M = 24.6 years) adults were given measures of verbal ability, 
working memory, processing speed, inhibition, thinking dispositions, and completed three 
reasoning tasks: a syllogistic reasoning task, a base rate task, and the Cognitive Reflection Test. 
Our results indicate that age-related declines in algorithmic capacity and reflective processes 
account for a significant portion of age-related variance in reasoning. Overall, this study provides 
evidence consistent with a dual-process theory of age-related differences in reasoning. 
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Dual-Process Theory of Reasoning and Aging 
2.1. Introduction 
Overriding an erroneous Type 1, intuitive response can be difficult because these types of 
responses are subjectively appealing, feel intuitively correct, and support prior beliefs, opinions, 
and knowledge (Epstein, 1994; Klaczynski & Robinson, 2000; Thompson, 2009, 2010). This is 
especially problematic for reasoning problems that pit intuition against logic (i.e., conflict 
problems), where the participant is strongly cued to respond intuitively, but the intuitive response 
conflicts with the logical response (De Neys & Van Gelder, 2009). In other words, when the 
Type 1 output disagrees with logical analysis provided by Type 2 processes, individuals have 
more difficulty than when the two systems output similar responses.  
Resolving such conflict is even more challenging for older adults (De Neys & Van 
Gelder, 2009; Gilinsky & Judd, 1994). In fact, when older and younger adults’ performance on 
conflict problems is compared, older adults provide more intuitive responses than younger 
adults; however, when there is no conflict (i.e., the two systems produce the same response), 
older adults perform on par with younger adults. In other words, older adults are at a significant 
disadvantage when faced with problems where they need to separate logic and intuition (De 
Neys & Van Gelder, 2009; Gilinsky & Judd, 1994).  
Although there is evidence to suggest that capacity based differences (i.e., working 
memory and processing speed) explain the age-related difficulty in overriding the intuitively 
cued response on conflict problems (Fisk & Sharp, 2002; Gilinsky & Judd, 1994; Salthouse, 
2005), these studies do not always directly measure whether these variables attenuate the age-
related differences in reasoning. In addition, there are other issues that need to be addressed, 
including the limited measures of reasoning utilized previously, inconsistencies in the literature, 
and alternative factors that have been proposed to explain the difference. 
We used four measures to assess algorithmic capacity: verbal ability, working memory, 
processing speed, and inhibition (see Chapter 1 for an overview of these factors). Research has 
indicated that these factors are related to reasoning ability (e.g., De Neys & Van Gelder, 2009; 
Fisk & Sharp; 2002; Gilinsky & Judd, 1994; Stanovich, 2011), however it is not clear whether 
these factors attenuate age-related differences in reasoning. If cognitive capacity can explain age-
related variance in reasoning, then individuals higher in working memory capacity, inhibitory 
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control, and processing speed should be better able to engage in Type 2 thinking and override 
intuitive responses.  In addition to the capacity of the algorithmic level, another individual 
difference variable that plays a role in reasoning ability is the reflective level or rational thinking 
dispositions: the predisposition to engage in logical analytic, Type 2 thinking (Kokis et al., 2002; 
Macpherson & Stanovich, 2007; Sá, et al., 1999; Stanovich, 1999; 2004; 2011; Stanovich & 
West, 1997; 1998).  Strong evidence that thinking dispositions are related to critical thinking has 
been found in young adults by Stanovich and colleagues (Stanovich and West, 1997; 1998; 2007; 
West et al., 2008). The present research was the first study to investigate the potential role of 
thinking dispositions in older adults’ reasoning and the potential role the reflective level plays in 
age-related differences in reasoning ability. It was expected that this age-related difference 
would explain, at least part of, the reasoning performance difference between young and old 
adults.  
With respect to the present study, we hypothesized that individuals with a disposition to 
an analytic reasoning style would perform better on both conflict and neutral problems because 
both problem types require Type 2, analytic engagement to provide the logical response. Also, 
because older adults have been shown to have a tendency to respond based on heuristic cues, 
rather than analytic cues (Klaczynski & Robinson, 2000), it was predicted that older adults 
would report a thinking style that is more intuitive than younger adults. Finally, it was also 
expected that this age-related difference would explain, at least part of, the reasoning 
performance difference between young and old adults.  
In sum, researchers have shown that older adults show differences in working memory 
and processing speed relative to young adults and that these two factors contribute to variance on 
reasoning tasks, however, what is unclear is the extent to which these factors, along with the 
additional proposed factors (i.e., inhibition and reflective processes), attenuate the age-related 
difference in reasoning.  
 
2.2. Method 
2.2.1. Participants 
 Seventy-two younger adults (46 female) (M = 24.6 years; SD = 7.54) and seventy-two 
older adults (55 female) (M = 80.0 years, SD = 7.28) were recruited for this study. Young adults 
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were recruited from the University of Saskatchewan campus in exchange for course credit or 
monetary compensation
1
. Older adults were recruited from the community through an informal 
information session or posters placed at community living residences or through mailing 
invitations to participate to members of the Saskatoon Council on Aging, a non-profit 
organization with programs and services for seniors in Saskatoon, SK. All older adults were 
offered a nominal honorarium for their participation. In addition to their gender and age, 
participants were also asked how many years of formal education they had completed 
(elementary, high school, and university), as well as the highest level of education they had 
obtained. 
 Older adults were screened for mild cognitive dysfunction using the Modified Mini-
Mental State Exam (3MS; Teng & Chui, 1987). Any participant not meeting the minimum 
required score of 79 was excluded and replaced in the study (see Teng & Chui, 1987 for 
explanation).  A total of 6 participants were replaced. In addition, all participants completed the 
word reading subscale of the Wide Range Achievement Test, 4
th
 Edition (WRAT4) (Wilkinson 
& Robertson, 2006) in order to assess and match participants’ verbal ability.   
2.2.2. Materials 
2.2.2.1.Working Memory Measure. Working memory capacity was assessed using the 
List Span Task (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; De Beni et al., 1998). This task requires 
participants to hold target words in working memory (i.e., the last word in a list of 5 words, for a 
total of 3-6 words in each set), while completing a distracter task (i.e., knocking when an animal 
word was presented), and takes approximately 5-8 minutes to administer. Following completion, 
we calculated the list span for each participant, the highest level at which all the final words were 
recalled in the correct order. Young adults had a range of 0-6 words, while older adults had a 
range of 0-5 words; the higher the score the higher the working memory.  
2.2.2.2. Processing Speed Measure. Processing speed was measured using the Letter 
Comparison and Pattern Comparison tests as described by Salthouse (1996). The letter 
comparison test consists of two sets of adjacent letter sets of three, six, or nine letters presented 
in random order. Participants must visually scan each adjacent set and write S or D, indicating if 
the adjacent sets were the same or different, respectively. The pattern comparison test consists of 
                                                 
1
 There were no differences between these two groups on any of the dependent measures.  
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sets of two adjacent line patterns composed of three, six, or nine line segments and again 
participants are asked to scan the adjacent sets and write S or D accordingly. Participants 
completed two 30s trials for both tasks. The dependent measure was the number correct minus 
the number of incorrect responses produced within 30s for each trial. This number was then 
standardized and averaged across the letters and line versions to produce a composite processing 
speed score.  
2.2.2.3. Inhibition Measure. The Victoria Stroop Test (Troyer et al., 2006) was used to 
measure response inhibition. This task requires participants to respond as quickly as possible to 
three different stimuli cards: dots, words, and colors. The dots card contains 24 dots printed in 
blue, green, red, or yellow, which are presented in a pseudo-random order within the array, each 
color appearing once in each row. The words card consists of common words (when, hard, and, 
over) printed in the same four colors and participants are asked to name the color the word is 
printed in, disregarding the verbal stimuli. The colors card consists of the color names “blue, 
green, red, and yellow” printed in lower case with the print color never corresponding to the 
color name; participants are instructed not to read the word, but to tell the researcher the color in 
which the word is printed. The order of the cards is presented in the same sequence to each 
participant: dots, words, colors.  Participants are instructed to name the colors across the rows 
from left to right and are timed on each task.  Errors are also coded for and are only classified as 
an error if not spontaneously corrected by the participant. The dependent measure for this task is 
a ratio of dots time/colors time, with an increased ratio indicating poor inhibitory capacity. 
2.2.2.4. Thinking Dispositions. One way to appraise the reflective level is to have 
reasoners complete a measure of thinking dispositions. We chose the Actively Open-Minded 
Thinking scale (AOT) developed by Stanovich and colleagues (1997; 2007; 2008), which 
measures preference for analytic versus heuristic thinking. Lower AOT scores reflect a 
preference for intuitive heuristic-based thinking, while higher scores indicate a self-reported 
tendency for cognitive flexibility (Stanovich & West, 1997); thus, it was anticipated that in 
situations of conflict, individuals with low AOT scores would be more likely to respond based on 
T1 output than on T2 output. All items were scored such that higher scores represented a greater 
tendency toward open-minded thinking. Examples of items are “People should always take into 
consideration evidence that goes against their beliefs,” and “No one can talk me out of something 
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I know is right” (reverse scored). The responses for each item in the questionnaire were strongly 
agree (6), moderately agree (5), slightly agree (4), slightly disagree (3), moderately disagree (2), 
and strongly disagree (1). The score on the scale was obtained by summing the 41 responses to 
the items. 
2.2.2.5. Reasoning Tests. In order to assess reasoning ability participants were asked to 
complete three reasoning tasks.   
2.2.2.5.1. Syllogistic Reasoning task.  Participants were presented with 12 syllogistic 
reasoning problems, taken from Shynkaruk & Thompson (2006) (Appendix A), and 
shown on a high-resolution computer monitor using E-Prime (Schneider, Eschman, & 
Zuccolotto, 2002).  Each reasoning problem consisted of a pair of quantified premises 
followed by a conclusion. All problems were multiple-model problems (i.e., required the 
construction of two or three models to test conclusion’s validity). Four of the problems 
led to believable conclusions, four to unbelievable, and four to neutral conclusions. On 
each trial, participants were shown the premises and conclusion simultaneously and asked 
to evaluate the logical validity of the conclusion (whether it is entailed by the premises); 
half of the conclusions for problems in each believability condition were valid and half 
were invalid. These combinations led to the divisions of conflict (valid-unbelievable and 
invalid-believable), no-conflict (valid-believable and invalid-unbelievable), and neutral 
(valid-neutral and invalid-neutral) problems. Participants were asked to decide whether 
the conclusion given at the end of the problem follows logically from the information 
given within that problem. They were informed that “to answer each question, you must 
assume that all information which you are given is true; this is very important.” 
Participants were instructed to choose “yes” if the conclusion followed logically from the 
premises and “no” if it did not. The keys corresponding to each response alternated 
across participants, so that for half of the participants one key corresponded to “no and 
for the remainder it corresponded to “yes.” Problems were presented in a different 
random order for each participant. Before beginning the task, participants were provided 
with a practice problem to familiarize them with the type of problems they would 
encounter.  
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2.2.2.5.2. Base rate Task.  A total of 12 base rate problems adapted from De Neys and 
Glumicic (2008) (see Appendix B for examples) were presented to participants on a high-
resolution computer monitor using E-Prime.  These problems consist of two parts: first, 
participants read a scenario describing the sample composition (e.g., a sample with 4 men 
and 996 women); second they were shown a short personality description of one of the 
participants (which was stereotypical or neutral). They were then asked to indicate to 
which population group the participant most likely belongs. Four of the problems were 
conflict (larger base rate and personality description not congruent), four were no-conflict 
(larger base rate and personality description congruent), and four were neutral 
(personality description does not evoke stereotype). The problems were presented in a 
different random order for each participant.  There were two base rate probabilities; 
within each problem type, two problems were presented with a 995/5 and two with a 
996/4 base rate ratio.  For each ratio, participants were asked to make one judgement 
about the smaller category and one about the larger category.  
2.2.2.5.3. The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT).  The CRT (Frederick, 2005) was used to 
measure the ability to override intuitive responses. This test consists of three questions 
that require individuals to override an impulsive T1 answer by engaging in Type 2 
processing, and thus, is a quick measure of Type 1 response tendencies (Appendix C). 
This test was presented in paper and pencil format and participants took as long as 
necessary to complete this task. 
2.2.3. Procedure 
All of the older adults were pre-screened using the 3MS at the beginning of the 
experiment.  The other measures were divided into two blocks, Block A, computer based 
reasoning tasks (i.e., syllogistic and base rate task) and Block B, pen and paper measures (i.e., 
verbal ability measure, working memory, processing speed, inhibition, AOT, and CRT).  Half of 
the young and older adults saw Block A tests first and the other half saw Block B tests first.  
Within Block A, task order was randomized to control for order effects; Block B was not 
randomized.  In an attempt to counter unfamiliarity and physical slowing that some older adults 
may experience when responding on a computer, for the syllogistic and base rate tasks, all older 
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adults were asked to answer aloud and the experimenter pressed the corresponding keyboard 
key
2
. All participants were tested individually, in a single session that lasted between 1.5 – 2.5 
hours (older adults required more time for many of the tasks). 
2.3. Results 
2.3.1. Transformations 
Inhibition score distributions were positively skewed; consequently log transformations 
were performed. All subsequent analyses were performed using the transformed scores. 
Skewness values for the other variables (education, verbal ability, working memory, processing 
speed, AOT, and CRT) were not significant and therefore, they were not transformed. 
2.3.2. Scoring 
Means and standard deviations for all variables are set out in Table 2.1.  It should be 
noted that a high score on the inhibition ratio indicates poor inhibitory control; in all other cases, 
higher scores indicate greater ability. For the syllogistic reasoning task, an answer was scored as 
the correct response when reasoners responded “yes” to valid conclusions and “no” to invalid 
conclusions. For the base rate task, we took a different approach because it is not possible to 
derive a measure of normative accuracy without combining the base rate with probability 
estimates for the personality description (Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2012; Pennycook & 
Thompson, 2012; Thompson et al., 2011). Thus, we used the proportion of base rate responses 
chosen as the dependent variable. An answer was scored as the base rate response when 
participants chose the group corresponding to the larger base rate. For the CRT, an answer was 
scored as the correct response when reasoners provided the mathematically correct response. 
Scores on the AOT were obtained by summing the 41 responses to the items. 
2.3.3. Analysis Strategy 
The data are reported in three sections. The first section examines potential age-related 
effects on education, verbal ability, WM, processing speed, inhibition, AOT, and performance on 
the syllogistic, base rate tasks, and CRT by computing independent t-tests between young and 
older adults. Refer to Table 2.1 for these data. In the second section, to test the hypothesis that 
                                                 
2
 It should be noted that when the experimenter pressed the response key, the experimenter was blind to the 
questions on the screen. Thus, any age-related differences should be attributed to age and not experimenter bias. 
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older adults would be at a disadvantage on problems requiring Type 2 thinking, we used 
ANOVAs to examine age-related change in performance on conflict, no-conflict, and neutral 
problems, for the syllogistic and base rate tasks and differences on the CRT. Finally, to further 
examine the extent to which the algorithmic and reflective levels attenuate age-related 
differences in reasoning, the correlation and regression analyses are reported for the algorithmic 
capacity constructs, syllogistic task, base rate task, and the CRT, respectively.  
 
Table 2.1 
Means and Standard Deviations for all Variables by Age Group. 
  Younger Adults Older Adults  
p-value  Mean SD Mean SD 
Education 16.24 yrs 2.32 14.02 yrs 3.65 p < .001 
Verbal 111.22 9.18 113.11 13.31 p = .324 
WM 3.26 1.42 1.38 1.66 p < .001 
Speed .52 .62 -.84 .54 p < .001 
Inhibition 1.21 .11 1.34 .19 p < .001 
AOT 176.69 19.69 164.84 23.86 p = .002 
CRT .44/3 .39 .13/3 .25 p < .001 
SR performance .69 .14 .56 .15 p < .001 
BR performance .73 .19 .59 .16 p < .001 
Note: Data were not available for all older adults on education (missing 3), inhibition (missing 
1), AOT (missing 2), and the MIA (missing 1). SR performance = syllogistic reasoning 
proportion correct. BR performance = base rate proportion correct.  
 
Consistent with our expectations, younger adults had more years of education, greater 
working memory capacity, faster processing speed, higher inhibitory ability, and performed 
better on the CRT than their older adult counterparts. Young and old adults were matched on 
verbal ability; therefore no difference was expected between the groups. Also consistent with our 
predictions, older adults were less likely than young adults to give correct responses to the 
syllogism task and the CRT, and were more likely to respond on the basis of the stereotypes on 
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the base rate task. Additionally, an important and novel finding was that older and young adults 
differed on the AOT, with older adults expressing more reliance on heuristic styles.  
It is important to note the mean scores for verbal ability for each group were higher than 
average (M = 100; Wilkinson & Robertson, 2006), t (71) ≥ 8.36, p < .001; demonstrating that our 
group of participants had a higher verbal capacity than the average young or older adult. Also, 
the average total years of education for the older adults was 2 years of post-secondary education, 
which is a higher level of education than is normally found in older populations.  
Next, to test the hypothesis that older adults would provide more intuitive responses, 
computed ANOVA’s for the syllogistic and base rate tasks, and the CRT.  
2.3.4. Syllogistic Reasoning Task ANOVA.  The SR response data were analyzed using 
a 3 (problem type: conflict, no-conflict, and neutral) x 2 (age group) mixed-factors ANOVA, 
with age group as the between-participants variable. Our dependent variable was the number of 
correct responses, defined as whether participants said “YES” to valid problems or said “NO” to 
invalid problems. The means for each group appear in Table 2.1.  
There was a main effect of age, with younger adults (.69) providing more correct 
responses than older adults (.56), F(1, 142) = 29.12, MSE = .12, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .17. There was 
also a main effect of problem type, F(1.96, 272.01) = 79.90, MSE = .045, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .36; 
with no-conflict (.79) > neutral (.60) > conflict (.48), t ≥ 4.82, SE ≥ .024, p < .001. The two main 
effects were qualified by an interaction F (2, 284) = 20.48, MSE = .043, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .13. As 
shown in Figure 2.1, the differences between older and younger adults were observed on conflict 
and neutral problems [t (142) = 7.20, SE = .042, p <.001 and t (129.05) = 2.08, SE = .032, p = 
.039, respectively], but not on no-conflict problems, t (142) = .292, SE = .036, p = .770. 
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Figure 2.1.  Proportion of Correct Responses for the Syllogistic Task as a Function of 
         Problem Type and Age  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 Note. Error bars represent the standard error. 
 
 
2.3.5. Base Rate Task ANOVA. The BR data were also analyzed using a 3 (problem 
type: conflict, no conflict, and neutral) x 2 (age group) mixed-factors ANOVA, with age group 
as the between-participants variable. The dependent variable for this analysis was the number of 
base rate responses. The means for each group appear in Table 2.1. Consistent with predictions 
there was a main effect of age; younger adults based their responses on the base rate more often 
(.73) than older adults (.59), F(1, 142) = 23.41, MSE = .092, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .14. As seen in 
previous research (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008), there was a main effect of problem type, F(1.79, 
254.45) = 245.21, MSE = .06, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .63; such that base rate choices were the highest for 
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the no-conflict problems (.96), intermediate for neutral problems (.70), and lowest for the 
conflict problems (.34), t (143) ≥ 9.41, SE ≥ .025, p < .001. Overall, the pattern of these results is 
consistent with the syllogistic task, because performance was lowest for the conflict problems, 
followed by the neutral and highest on the no-conflict problems.  
Both of these effects were qualified by an interaction that was also consistent with 
predictions, F(2, 284) = 16.99, MSE = .054, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .11. As shown in Figure 2.2, and 
consistent with the syllogistic task, the differences between older and younger adults were 
observed on conflict and neutral problems [t (131.64) = 4.48, SE = .057, p < .001, and t (142) = 
4.89, SE = .21, p < .001, respectively], with older adults providing fewer base rate responses than 
the young adults. Again, we assumed that these two problem types require a level of analytic 
processing to choose the base rate option; consequently, the results are consistent with the 
conclusion that the ability to engage in Type 2, analytic processing differs with age. There was a 
marginal difference on the no-conflict problems with older adults showing a slightly higher level 
of base rate responding, t (130.28) = 1.88, SE = .022, p = .062.  
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Figure 2.2.  Proportion of Base Rate Responses for the Base rate Task as a Function of 
                     Problem Type and Age 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Note. Error bars represent the standard error. 
 
 
 2.3.6. Cognitive Reflection Test ANOVA. The CRT data were also analyzed using a 3 
(problem) x 2 (age group) mixed-factors ANOVA, with age group as the between-participants 
variable. Data are presented in Figure 2.3. Young adults were more accurate (M = .44) than older 
adults (M = .13), F (1, 138) = 29.82, MSE = .323, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .178. There was also an 
interaction between problem and age, F (2, 276) = 3.86, MSE = .106, p = .022, ηp
2
 = .027. Young 
adults were equally accurate on the bat and ball and the widget problems [t (71) = 1.09, SE = 
.064, p = .278] and had the highest accuracy for the lily pad problem [t (71) ≥ 2.98, SE ≥ .056, p 
≤ .004]. Older adults had the highest accuracy for the widget and the lily pad problems [t (71) = 
1.00, SE = .044, p = .321] and lowest accuracy for the bat and ball problem [t (71) ≥ 1.94, SE ≥ 
.045, p ≤ .057]. One interpretation for the finding that performance on all problems, regardless of 
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age, was on the floor (i.e., less than 1 out of 3) is that the initial response for these problems is 
very compelling and thus, neither young or older adults are considering alternatives.  
 
 
Figure 2.3.  Proportion of Correct Responses (out of 3) for the Cognitive Reflection Test as 
                    a Function of Problem and Age 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Note. Error bars represent the standard error. 
 
To test our hypothesis that the measures of the algorithmic and reflective levels were 
related to the age-related difference, we ran correlation and regression analyses. Refer to Table 
2.2 for the zero-order correlations among the major variables in the study.   
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Table 2.2 
Correlations Between Age, Education, Verbal Ability, Working Memory, Processing Speed, Inhibition, AOT, CRT, Syllogistic Task 
Performance, and Base Rate Task Performance.  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1) Age -          
2) ED -.334** -         
3) Verbal .104 .217* -        
4) WM -.566** .219* .031 -       
5) PS -.808** .406** .040 .531** -      
6) INH .395** -.039 -.104 -.280** -.271** -     
7) AOT -.265* .533** .075 .257* .305** -.024 -    
8) CRT -.436** .175* .075 .385** .465** -.267** .216* -   
9) SR -.412** .205* .161
a
 .285** .395** -.094 .261* .460** -  
10) BR  -.356** .278** .054 .356** .345** -.167* .373** .290** .284** - 
 
* p < .05; ** p ≤ .001; a p < .10; two-tailed 
Note. AOT = the Actively Open-Minded Thinking Scale; CRT = Cognitive Reflection Test; SR = overall syllogistic task performance; 
BR = overall base rate task performance  
   
  
2
5
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Working memory was positively correlated with all three of the reasoning tasks. This is 
consistent with previous findings and suggests that those with higher working memory capacity 
are better reasoners (Capon et al., 2003; De Neys & Verschueren, 2006; Kyllonen & Christal, 
1990; Markovits et al., 2002; Quayle & Ball, 2000). Processing speed was also correlated with 
the syllogistic task, the base rate task, and the CRT, suggesting that as processing speed 
increases, so does reasoning performance. Processing speed was also correlated with working 
memory, providing evidence that these measures tap similar processes. Inhibition was unrelated 
to performance on the syllogistic task, but negatively correlated with the base rate task and the 
CRT, suggesting that performance on these tasks improved as inhibitory ability increased. All of 
the above correlations provide strong evidence that individual differences in algorithmic capacity 
are associated with reasoning performance. There was also evidence for the importance of 
reflection in reasoning, because the AOT was also correlated with performance on the syllogistic 
task, base rate task, and the CRT. These results provide evidence that a flexible thinking style is 
related to better reasoning performance. Scores on the AOT were also correlated with education, 
suggesting that a higher level of education is associated with more flexible thinking. 
Additionally, providing support for the argument that the there is some overlap between the 
algorithmic and reflective processes (Stanovich, 2009), is the fact that the AOT was correlated 
with WM and PS.  
The correlations in Table 2.2 indicate that most of the variables are correlated with one 
another, and with performance on the reasoning tasks, which raises the question of whether all of 
these variables would predict unique variance in age-related reasoning differences. The 
following regression analyses sought to remedy this question.  
  
2.3.7. Shared Variance between the Algorithmic Capacity Constructs. To test the 
hypothesis that age-related differences in working memory may be attributed to differences in 
processing speed (Salthouse, 1991; 2000; Salthouse & Babcock, 1991) or to poor inhibitory 
mechanisms (De Beni et al., 1998), hierarchical regression analyses were conducted to examine 
the proportion of variance in working memory associated with age after controlling for 
processing speed and inhibition.  The results from the regression are summarized in Table 2.3 
and reveal substantial attenuation (82%) in working memory variance after controlling for 
  
27 
 
processing speed; however, the remaining age-related variance in working memory was greater 
than  0 (R
2
 = .057; p = .001).  
These results support the assumptions of previous researchers, that some, but not all, of 
the age-related differences in working memory may be an artifact of slower speed of processing 
(Salthouse, 1994; 1996; 2000; Salthouse & Babcock, 1991). However, significant residual age-
related variance in working memory remained that was independent of processing speed. There 
was little evidence to support the assumption that age-related differences in working memory can 
be attributed to poor inhibitory mechanisms. The attenuation of age-related variance in working 
memory was small (22%) and there was significant age variance remaining after the control of 
inhibition (R
2
 = .252; p < .001).  
 
Table 2.3 
 Proportions of Shared Age-related Variance in Algorithmic Capacity Constructs 
 Age alone R
2
 After WM R
2
 
change 
After PS R
2
 
change 
After Inhibition 
R
2
 change 
WM .323** -- .057** (.82) .252** (.22) 
PS .652** .378** (.42) -- .580** (.11) 
Inhibition .156** .082** (.47) .089** (.43) -- 
Note. WM = working memory; PS = processing speed. The numbers in brackets indicate the 
proportion of shared variance among mediating and criterion predictors. 
** p ≤ .001 
 
2.3.8. Syllogistic Task Regression. To test the hypothesis that the aforementioned 
variables would attenuate age-related differences in reasoning, we ran a hierarchical regression 
with four blocks of variables. In block one, education and verbal ability were entered, followed 
by the measures of algorithmic capacity as a block (working memory, processing speed, and 
inhibition), the Actively Open-minded Thinking scale, and finally, age. Age was entered last to 
determine if there were any additional unspecified age-related effects (see Gilinsky & Judd, 
1994) and if the variables significantly attenuated the age-related differences in reasoning ability 
(by comparing the regression of age alone to the age-related variance after variables were 
partialled out). Results from the regression analysis are summarized in Table 2.4. Based on the 
hypothesis that performance would vary by problem, separate regressions were performed for 
conflict, no-conflict, and neutral problems. 
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Table 2.4  
Hierarchical Regression for the Syllogistic Reasoning Task.  
Predictor    Conflict Problems  No-conflict Problems     Neutral Problems 
                                  Cumulative R
2
 in hierarchical steps 
Education (B1)    
Verbal (B1) .058* .010 .014 
WM (B2)    
PS (B2) .243** .025 .038 
Inhibition (B2)    
AOT (B3) .262** .029 .046 
Age (B4) .332** .029 .059 
                                   R
2 
Change 
Education (B1)  
.058* 
  
Verbal (B1) .010 .014 
WM (B2)    
PS (B2) .186** .015 .024 
Inhibition (B2) 
 
  
AOT (B3) .018
a
 .003 .008 
Age (B4) .070** .000 .089 
                                 R
2 
age alone  
Age only .266** .000 .036* 
                               Standardized Beta weights for predictors 
Education (B1) .199* (3.8) -.046 .059 
Verbal (B1) .101 .098 .090 
WM (B2) .126 -.093 .119 
PS (B2) .408** (10.3) .151 .072 
Inhibition (B2) .047 -.008 .012 
AOT (B3) .159
a
 (1.8) .067 .108 
Age (B4) -.509** (7.0) .013 -.219 
                                Standardized Beta weights from Age alone regression 
Age only -.515** -.015 -.190* 
Note. B1= block 1; B2 = block 2; B3 = block 3; B4 = block 4.  
WM = working memory; PS = processing speed; AOT = Actively Open-Minded Thinking scale.  
The numbers in brackets indicate the percentage of unique variance explained by that factor. 
* p < .05; ** p ≤ .001; a p < .10 
 
 
 
 
 
  
29 
 
2.3.8.1. Conflict problems 
 The overall regression equation was significant, [F (7, 137) = 9.21, p < .001], with the 
cluster of factors accounting for 33.2% of variance in responses on conflict problems. The 
criterion variables in the first block of the regression analysis were education and verbal ability, 
and they accounted for 5.8% of the variance (p = .018), with education being the only factor to 
contribute unique variance (3.8%; p = .021). Entered second as a block, working memory, 
processing speed, and inhibition accounted for 18.6% of the variance (p < .001), with processing 
speed being the only significant predictor of this block, accounting for 10.3% of unique variance 
(p < .001). The third block consisted of the AOT and was only marginally significant (p = .075). 
  In the fourth block, when the overlap with the other variables is partialled out, age 
remained a significant predictor (7.0%) in the ability to choose the correct response to conflict 
problems (p < .001). The attenuation of the age-related effects by all of the factors was 
substantial, 73.7% (i.e., [1- (.070/.266)]*100; see Salthouse, 1991), with a reduction from 26.6% 
to 7%, the remaining variance suggests there is at least one additional factor, which we have not 
considered, that can predict age-related differences on this task. We discuss this possibility 
below.  
2.3.8.2. No-conflict problems 
As expected, there were no age differences in performance on the no-conflict problems 
and none of the variables were significant in the regression equation, F (7, 137) = .55, p = .796, 
providing evidence that the age-related differences in algorithmic and reflective processes do not 
impact performance on no-conflict problems. This is likely because reasoners can use their Type 
1 output and still provide the correct response. 
2.3.8.3. Neutral problems  
For neutral problems, the overall regression equation was also not significant, F (7, 137) 
= 1.17, p = .327. It is possible that the neutral problems in the syllogistic task may require less 
Type 2, analytic engagement than previously thought, or perhaps the neutral problems are too 
difficult to successfully engage the analytic system. Although prior t-tests revealed that young 
adults outperformed older adults on these problems, the regression suggests that age has little to 
do with this performance difference. These results indicate that reasoners might be adopting a 
strategy that does not require a great deal of T2 engagement. One possible strategy, based on the 
difficulty of the task, is that reasoners are just giving up and guessing. However, performance for 
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both groups was above chance. Moreover, both young (70%) and older adults (63%) 
demonstrated a “yes” bias for these problems, such that these values were both greater than 50% 
(guessing) [t (71) ≥ 3.08, SE ≥ .03,  p ≤ .003], but did not differ from one another, t (129.77), SE 
= .05, p = .160.  These results suggest that both young and older adults are adopting a strategy in 
the form of a systematic bias to say yes, which may be another form of heuristic processing. 
2.3.9. Additional Age-related Variance. The regression analysis for the conflict 
problems suggests that at least some of the difference between older and younger adults cannot 
be attributed to algorithmic capacity (or the marginal effect of thinking dispositions). One 
possibility discussed by Gilinsky and Judd (1994) is a greater tendency for belief bias, endorsing 
conclusions on the basis of belief rather than based on logic (Evans, Barston, & Pollard, 1983), 
as we age. The standard way to measure this is through a belief index and a validity index. To 
compute a belief index, mean acceptance (i.e., proportion of yes responses) for unbelievable 
problems (i.e., valid-unbelievable and invalid-unbelievable) was subtracted from mean 
acceptance for believable problems (i.e., valid-believable and invalid-believable). To compute 
the validity index, mean acceptance for invalid problems was subtracted from the mean 
acceptance for valid problems.  
The effect of belief was larger for older adults (.45) than for the young adults (.16), t 
(133.45) = 5.48, SE = .054, p < .001. Also, young adults were better at discriminating between 
valid and invalid problems (.37) than older adults (.12), t (142) = 5.40, SE = .047, p < .001. Both 
of these results suggest that older adults were demonstrating a greater belief-bias than young 
adults, which is consistent with prior research (Gilinsky & Judd, 1994) and suggests another 
factor that likely contributes to the age-related difference in reasoning ability. 
 
2.3.10. Base Rate Task Regression. The regression analysis for base rate data was 
identical to the syllogistic task, with the DV in this regression being the proportion of base rate 
responses. Results from the regression are summarized in Table 2.5. Again, regressions were 
performed for conflict, no-conflict, and neutral problems.    
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Table 2.5 
 Hierarchical Regression for the Base Rate Task.  
Predictor Conflict Problems No-conflict Problems Neutral Problems 
                                   Cumulative R
2
 in hierarchical steps 
Education (B1)    
Verbal (B1) .084* .019 .031 
WM (B2)    
PS (B2) .187** .039 .115* 
Inhibition (B2)   . 
AOT (B3) .231** .041 .147* 
Age (B4) .237** .086 .167** 
                                   R
2 
Change 
Education (B1)  
.084* 
  
Verbal (B1) .019 .031 
WM (B2)    
PS (B2) .103** .020 .084* 
Inhibition (B2) 
 
  
AOT (B3) .044* .002 .032* 
Age (B4) .006 .046* .019
a
 
                                 R
2 
for age alone  
Age only .130** .032 .115** 
                            Standardized Beta weights for predictors 
Education (B1) .296** (8.4) -.066 .177 
Verbal (B1) -.049 .133 -.003 
WM (B2) .232* (3.8) -.144 .197* (2.8) 
PS (B2) .158 -.008 .117 
Inhibition (B2) .001 -.069 -.070 
AOT (B3) .246* (4.4) -.051 .210* (3.2) 
Age (B4) -.154 .411* -.269
a 
(2.0) 
                                    Standardized Beta weights from Age alone regression 
Age only -.361** .180* -.339** 
Note. B1= Block 1; B2 = Block 2; B3 = Block 3; B4 = Block 4. WM = working memory; PS = 
processing speed; AOT = Actively Open-Minded Thinking scale.  
The numbers in brackets indicate the percentage of unique variance explained by that factor. 
* p < .05; ** p ≤ .001; a p < .10 
 
2.3.9.1. Conflict problems 
 As was the case in the syllogistic task, the regression equation for conflict problems was 
significant, [F (7, 137) = 5.78, p < .001], with the cluster of variables accounting for a significant 
portion (23.7%) of total variance. The first block of variables entered (education and verbal 
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ability) accounted for 8.4% (p = .003), with education independently contributing to all the 
variance (p = .001). The criterion variables in the second block were working memory, 
processing speed, and inhibition, and while this block contributed to 10.3% (p = .001), only 
working memory accounted for a unique portion of this variance, 3.8% (p = .014). The third 
block, the AOT, also accounted for unique variance 4.4% (p = .007); however, the fourth block 
(age) was not significant (p = .298).  The attenuation of the age-related effects was almost at the 
ceiling, 95.4%, with a reduction from 13% to 0%. Thus, the predictors account for almost all of 
the age-related variance in conflict problem performance differences between young and old 
adults. Thus, on both the syllogistic and base rate tasks, the algorithmic capacity block was a 
significant predictor, and the measure of reflective processes (AOT) was a predictor on the base 
rate and syllogistic (marginally) tasks. Age only predicted residual variance on the syllogistic 
task.  
2.3.9.2. No-Conflict Problems 
Also consistent with the syllogistic task, the regression model for no-conflict problems 
was not significant, F (7, 137) = 1.75, p = .103. The results of this regression lend further support 
to the idea that algorithmic and reflective processes are not be related to performance on no-
conflict problems. Regardless of the process employed, both will lead to the correct answer. 
2.3.9.3. Neutral problems  
The regression results for neutral problems were not consistent with the syllogistic task, 
but were almost identical to the conflict problems in this task, with the exception of the first 
block. The overall regression equation was significant, accounting for 16.7% of variance in 
neutral problem performance, F (7, 137) = 3.71, p = .001. The first block entered into the 
equation was not significant. Consistent with the conflict problems blocks 2 and 3 were 
significant, accounting for 8.4% (p = .007) and 3.2% (p = .029) of unique variance, respectively. 
Again, working memory (2.8%, p = .044) and the AOT (3.2%, p = .029) were the significant 
criterion variables. Age did not predict unique variance in neutral problem performance.  
Referring to the data in Table 2.5, it can be seen that the attenuation of the age-related 
effects was substantial, 83.5%, with a reduction from 11.5% to 1.9%. Thus, consistent with the 
conflict base rate problems, the predictors account for almost all of the age-related variance in 
neutral problem performance differences between young and old adults. 
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2.3.10. Cognitive Reflection Test Regression. All three problems on the CRT can be 
classified as conflict problems, thus only one hierarchical regression was performed. Results 
from the regression are summarized in Table 2.6. 
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Table 2.6 
 Hierarchical Regression for the Cognitive Reflection Test.  
Predictor     CRT performance 
                   Cumulative R
2
 in hierarchical steps 
Education (B1)  
Verbal (B1) .024 
WM (B2)  
PS (B2) .256** 
Inhibition (B2)  
AOT (B3) .264** 
Age (B4) .266** 
                                     R
2 
Change 
Education (B1)  
.024 Verbal (B1) 
WM (B2)  
PS (B2) .232** 
Inhibition (B2) 
 
AOT (B3) .008 
Age (B4) .002 
                                R
2 
for age alone  
Age only .191** 
Standardized Beta weights for predictors 
Education (B1) .139 
Verbal (B1) .048 
WM (B2) .160
a 
(1.8) 
PS (B2) .366** (8.0) 
Inhibition (B2) -.123 
AOT (B3) .103 
Age (B4) -.084 
Standardized Beta weights for age alone 
Age only -.436** 
Note. B1= Block 1; B2 = Block 2; B3 = Block 3;  
B4 = Block 4. WM = working memory;  
PS = processing speed;  
AOT = Actively Open-Minded Thinking scale.  
The numbers in brackets indicate 
 the percentage of unique variance  
explained by that factor. 
* p < .05; ** p ≤ .001; a p < .10 
  
 
  
35 
 
The predictors accounted for 26.6% of the variance in CRT scores, F (7, 137) = 6.72, p < 
.001. However, only processing speed accounted for a significant portion of unique variance in 
performance (8%). No other variables contributed unique variance. The attenuation of the age-
related effects was 99%, with a reduction in variance from 19% to 0%. One possible explanation 
for the absence of relationships with other factors is that there is no age-related variance to 
predict. Performance for both young and old adults was on the floor and thus, there is an 
attenuated range for the performance scores on this task.  
 
2.4. Discussion 
 Across three reasoning tasks, we demonstrated that both algorithmic and reflective 
processes contribute to age-related differences in reasoning performance. Our work advances on 
previous work (Fisk & Sharp, 2002; Gilinsky & Judd, 1994; Salthouse, 2005) and has 
demonstrated that capacity differences (i.e., working memory and processing speed) explain age-
related differences in reasoning performance. The current research also explored the possibility 
that reflective processes may explain the age-related differences in reasoning performance. We 
were successful in demonstrating that algorithmic capacity and reflective processes attenuate 
age-related reasoning differences, thus providing evidence for a dual-process theory of reasoning 
and aging. Indeed, we provided evidence for the hypothesis set forth from the DPT framework 
that both algorithmic and reflective components of the analytic system contribute to age-related 
differences in reasoning ability. 
 Results were consistent with prior research, which had demonstrated that older adults 
were at a disadvantage on conflict problems, but were spared on no-conflict problems (De Neys 
& Van Gelder, 2009). This is important because it clarifies that the age-related difference is not 
necessarily a general decline in ability, as is often claimed in the literature (e.g., Salthouse, 
2005). 
2.4.1. Algorithmic Processes  
 The results provided evidence that the algorithmic level of the analytic system is a 
contributing factor to age-related differences in reasoning ability. It was hypothesized that 
reasoners with less processing power would be at a disadvantage because it would limit their 
ability to engage in Type 2 processing. In all three reasoning tasks, the algorithmic block 
predicted reasoning performance, although the factor that emerged as unique was different for 
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the base rate task (i.e., WM), than for the syllogistic task and CRT (i.e., PS).  It is important to 
note however, that processing speed and working memory are correlated factors, and that 
controlling for processing speed attenuated a substantial portion the age-related variance in 
working memory. Thus, the significance of one factor does not rule out the importance of the 
other because both would be expected to play a role, but with different balances of influences 
depending on task demands. This is consistent with an argument posited by Salthouse (2005), 
who argued that the positive correlations between most of the capacity variables increases the 
likelihood that variance predicted by one variable will attenuate the age-related effects of the 
other related variables. Due to the fact that older adults demonstrated lower processing speed and 
working memory capacity it is not surprising that they were at a disadvantage on conflict 
problems relative to no-conflict problems and to young adults. This is consistent with the wide 
range of literature suggesting that these processing factors underlie age-related differences in 
cognitive abilities (e.g., Fisk & Sharp, 2002; Rozas, Juncos-Rabadàn, Soledad, Gonzàlez, 2008; 
Salthouse, 2005).  
 On both the syllogistic and base rate tasks, older adults had lower performance on 
conflict problems than the no-conflict problems and performance was lower on conflict problems 
than young adults’ performance. Also, older adults provided more Type 1, intuitive responses on 
the CRT than young adults. This is consistent with previous arguments (Klaczynski & Robinson, 
2000) that older adults rely more on prior opinion and belief when making decisions. 
  The picture for the neutral problems is less clear. Although older adults’ performance on 
neutral problems was lower than young adults, for both the syllogistic and base rate tasks, none 
of the capacity factors were significant predictors of performance on the syllogistic task, while 
working memory and the AOT predicted performance on neutral base rate problems. This was 
only partially consistent with our predictions because we assumed that neutral problems require 
Type 2 processing and performance on these problems should be predicted by capacity. It is 
possible that because older adults are less inclined to engage in this type of thinking they are 
utilizing a strategy of guessing; however, performance on neutral problems was above chance. 
 An alternative explanation for the findings is provided by Thompson’s (2009) 
metacognitive model. Specifically, because there is no compelling response generated when a 
reasoner attempts to solve a neutral problem, engagement in Type 2 processing will be 
dependent on how solvable the problem is deemed to be. Judgements of solvability can be based 
  
37 
 
on familiarity, expertise, complexity, or motivation. The problems in the syllogistic task contain 
non-words and thus, the judgement of solvability would likely be low because these problems 
are unfamiliar, complex, and individuals do not have expertise in solving these problems. 
Consequently, the likelihood of individuals attempting to solve the problem may also be low and 
reasoners may tend to give up. Another possibility is that both young and older adults are 
adopting the same strategy (to say “yes”), a strategy that does not require working memory. For 
this reason, there is only a slight young adult advantage of 6.5% on these problems. If this 
judgement or strategy choice is made at the outset of the reasoning process there is a strong 
possibility that Type 2 processing will not be attempted, which would explain the null 
relationship between performance and capacity.  
2.4.2. Reflective Processes 
Older adults reported a greater self-expressed tendency to rely on intuitive modes of 
thinking than young adults, as evidenced by their lower score on the AOT. Previous findings and 
our results suggest that older adults rely on their Type 1, intuitive system more so than their Type 
2, analytic system (Klaczynski & Robinson, 2000) and the AOT results demonstrate that older 
adults subjectively report this as well.  
To test the hypothesis that thinking style would predict performance, scores on the AOT 
were entered into the regression analyses for each task. It was discovered that the AOT was a 
unique predictor on the base rate task and a marginal predictor on the syllogistic task, suggesting 
that those who report a preference for analytic thinking choose a greater number of base rate and 
logically valid responses, than those who expressed tendencies to be less analytic. Although the 
AOT was correlated with the CRT, such that better performance was associated with a tendency 
for more open-minded thinking, the AOT was not a unique predictor of CRT performance.  
It is important to note that the AOT measures a tendency to engage in reflective thinking; 
however, reasoners still need enabling conditions to override the initial T1 response. First, 
reasoners need to possess the mindware, the knowledge of logical rules (Stanovich, 2009), to 
realize their beliefs are in conflict with the logical rules of the task. This may be absent in a 
syllogistic task, due to the fact that these problems are unfamiliar and complex. Second, 
reasoners need a cue to override the T1 response. If reasoners have a strong feeling of rightness 
(i.e., a metacognitive experience, which can signal when additional analysis is needed; 
Thompson, 2009; Thompson et al., 2011) in the initial response, it is unlikely that the response 
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will be re-examined. The questions in the CRT are believed to be answered with a strong feeling 
of rightness (Frederick, 2005), thus the cue to rethinking the initial response may be absent in the 
CRT, especially for the older adults.     
2.4.3. Inhibition  
Although inhibition was correlated with the CRT and the base rate task, it was not a 
unique predictor of performance in any of the three tasks. This was surprising because the ability 
to inhibit information has been implicated in successful analytic engagement (Handley et al., 
2004; Houdé et al., 2000; Moutier et al., 2002; Moutier & Houdé, 2003; Simoneau & Markovits, 
2003).  It can be argued that while we were able to measure inhibition, perhaps the Victoria 
Stroop Test measured the ability to inhibit or suppress irrelevant information (e.g., belief-based 
information) and that older individuals do not treat stereotypical or belief-based information as 
irrelevant (see Stanovich 2009 for argument regarding the Stroop as a measure of suppression). 
In other words, it is possible that reasoners may explicitly value belief-based and stereotypical 
information differently than base rate and logical validity information. It is also possible that 
older adults have a more firmly established or entrenched heuristic system, based on experience, 
so that evidence that contradicts their beliefs can rightly be given less weight (i.e., Bayesian 
analysis; Hahn & Oaksford, 2007). In other words, it makes less sense for them to discard the 
heuristic information, in favour of a set of numbers or logic. If this is the case, then it should not 
be surprising that inhibition does not attenuate age-related reasoning differences, because it is not 
necessary. However, more research is needed to determine the validity of this claim.  
2.4.4. Education 
We controlled for verbal ability scores, but we did not control for education. The data 
revealed that education predicted performance of conflict problems on both the syllogistic and 
base rate tasks.  This is consistent with prior findings, that education can positively influence 
performance on cognitive tasks (Everson-Rose, Mendes de Leon, Bienias, Wilson, & Evans, 
2003; McDowell, Lindsay, & Tuokko, 2004). Thus, education also explains age-related 
differences in reasoning performance.  
2.4.5. Age 
The fact that age contributed to unique variance in the conflict problems on the syllogistic 
task, but none of the base rate problems or the CRT implies that there is at least one additional 
age-related factor unaccounted for by the regression that predicts age-related differences in 
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performance on syllogistic conflict problems. As discussed previously, one likely candidate is 
susceptibility to belief bias (Gilinsky & Judd, 1994). Our results also support this possibility. 
When the belief-based response was consistent with logic, there were no response differences 
between age groups; when belief and logic were in conflict; older adults provided a greater 
percentage of belief-based responses than the younger adults. Furthermore, older adults were 
more susceptible to belief and demonstrated greater difficulty in their ability to distinguish 
between valid and invalid conclusions than the young adults. Further support for this assertion is 
that age did not account for unique variance in any of these latter conditions.  
 
2.4.6. Conclusions 
  On the assumption that belief-based and stereotypical responses are an output of the 
Type 1, heuristic system, our results lend credence to the conclusion that older adults have 
trouble shifting from Type 1 to Type 2 processing. Specifically, older adults appear to be at a 
disadvantage when they need to engage in Type 2 thinking to override the intuitive response. 
Older adults’ inability to override a potent response based on beliefs or stereotypes in favour of 
logic or probability was related to capacity and in some cases, thinking style. On no-conflict 
problems where this shift is not necessary to reason effectively older adults perform at the same 
level as young adults.  
 Furthermore, the data lend support to a dual-process theory of reasoning. Older adults 
provided more belief-based or stereotypical responses and had greater capacity differences than 
young adults, on all tasks, and the regression results provide evidence that these differences 
predicted age-related variance in reasoning performance. There was also some evidence to 
support the conclusion that reflective processes contribute to the age-related difference in 
reasoning. Older adults had lower scores than young adults on the AOT (measure of reflective 
processes) and these lower scores predicted performance on the base rate task and the syllogistic 
task (marginally). 
  Overall, this the most optimistic view we can give of the factors that attenuate age-
related difference in reasoning, because our sample is not representative of the general 
population, especially the general population of older adults. In fact, our sample of older adults is 
above average in many aspects. Both measures of education and verbal ability were above the 
typical scores for this cohort and even the mean age of the older adults was 80 years. Therefore, 
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it should not be anticipated that with a more average group of participants that we would see a 
great deal of correct or base rate responses. If anything, one would predict the opposite; that an 
average sample would make more belief-based and stereotypical responses, than our above 
average sample.  
2.4.7. Link to Chapters 3 and 4 
The fact that the cluster of variables entered into the regression equations only accounted 
for, at most, a third of the variance in age-related reasoning differences, suggests that there are 
additional factors related to age-related differences in performance on these problems. One 
possibility is metacognitive ability. Specifically, it is quite possible that the ability to engage 
Type 2 thinking and provide a correct or base rate response is related to how well reasoners are 
able to monitor their performance. This possibility will be examined further in Chapter 3. In 
Chapter 3, we will also investigate why performance was on the floor for the CRT. It is possible 
that the initial intuitive responses for the CRT questions are very compelling and thus, reasoners 
are responding to these questions with high confidence.   
In addition, although we found results consistent with our predictions that the variations 
in algorithmic and reflective processes predict the age-related difference in reasoning ability, 
missing from this picture is whether this is a strategic choice to conserve cognitive resources or a 
“lack of choice” because the older adults do not have the capacity to engage in Type 2 
processing. We intend to examine this in Chapter 4, where we will ask participants to reason 
from an alternative perspective.  
 Overall, we provided evidence for our conclusion that we should switch to a modern 
approach of explaining these age-related differences in reasoning. Specifically, that a dual-
process theory of reasoning and aging is an integrative theory, that is successful in accounting for 
previous findings and the findings of the current research. However, our subsequent research 
seeks to answer some of the aforementioned questions and extend this model of reasoning and 
aging.  
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Chapter 3 
Metacognition, Monitoring, and Age 
 
Abstract 
The goal of this paper was to extend the model of reasoning and aging proposed in our 
previous paper (Chapter 2) with a focus on metacognition and monitoring. We attempted to 
determine the extent to which the age-related differences in reasoning can be attributed to four 
measures of metacognition: conflict detection, confidence in individual answers and overall 
performance, and a self-report measure of this ability. In addition, we examined the hypothesis 
that conclusion believability and latency would be related to confidence, and that perceived task 
difficulty would be an additional measure of confidence that would be related to performance. 
Seventy-two older (M = 80.0 years) and 72 younger (M = 24.6 years) adults completed three 
reasoning tasks and were asked to provide confidence judgements for each problem and after two 
of the tasks. Response times were also recorded. Confidence and response time were used as 
measures of conflict detection.  The data indicate that older and younger adults use similar cues 
to confidence, suggesting that metacognitive processes are similar for both age groups. 
Furthermore, results were not consistent with the hypothesis that metacognition plays a role in 
successful reasoning ability in both young and old adults. Indeed, there is a limited degree to 
which metacognition explains the age-related difference in reasoning and in terms of dual-
process theory. 
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Metacognition, Monitoring, and Age 
In Chapter 2, we demonstrated that individuals often struggle with resolving conflict 
between logic and intuition, in a variety of reasoning tasks. We provided evidence that individual 
differences in conflict resolution reflected individual differences in the algorithmic and reflective 
components of the analytic system. We also showed that these components predicted, at least 
some of, the age-related differences in reasoning ability. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, this 
cannot be the whole story because the factors only accounted for, at most, 33% of the variance in 
age-related differences in reasoning performance. A potentially important missing part of the 
picture is age-related differences in self-monitoring or metacognition. Metacognitive ability is 
referred to as the ability to correctly assess one’s knowledge (Hertzog & Hultsch, 2000; Hertzog 
& Robinson, 2005; Koriat, Ma’ayan, & Nussinson, 2006; Pliske & Mutter, 1996). Thompson 
(2009) has argued that metacognitive processes are commonly used to assess the output of the 
heuristic system and to determine if there is a need for analytic engagement. In other words, 
metacognitive skills often determine whether a reasoner will attempt Type 2 processing.  
To investigate whether age-related differences in reasoning can be explained by 
differences in metacognitive ability, we examined four different constructs: conflict detection, 
confidence in individual answers and overall performance, and a self-report measure of this 
ability. In addition to these measures, we examined the role of conclusion believability and 
latency as cues to confidence, and perceived task difficulty as an alternative measure of 
confidence.  
3.1. Conflict Detection 
Relative to younger adults, older adults struggle to override conflict between logic and 
intuition, when reasoning (Chapter 2; De Neys & Van Gelder, 2009). Consider the following 
example taken from our stimulus set
3
: 
No well-educated people are Pennes 
Some judges are Pennes 
Therefore, some well-educated people are not judges                                                   
YES/NO 
 
This problem strongly cues the response “YES” because this conclusion is believable; 
however, the logically valid response is “NO”, consequently producing a conflict. In the current 
                                                 
3
 The stimulus set was identical to the set described in Chapter 1. 
  
43 
 
study, we sought to determine whether older adults’ difficulty on these problems reflects age-
related differences in awareness that the problem presents conflict. Alternatively, it is possible 
that older adults are aware of the conflict and attempt to engage in Type 2 processing, but 
nonetheless make more incorrect and stereotypical responses than younger adults (either 
erroneously or deliberately).  
Research examining performance on conflict problems in young adults has identified a 
variety of reasons why beliefs or stereotypes can dominate over logical reasoning (see De Neys 
& Glumicic, 2008 for review). One view suggests a lax conflict monitoring system, in which 
reasoners are simply unaware that there may be an alternative response (Ehrlinger, Johnson, 
Banner, Dunning, & Kruger, 2007; Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). This is 
assumed to occur because the initial response is compelling and participants do not realize there 
may be an alternative response, and as a result, participants do not initiate a process to inhibit the 
intuitive response (see De Neys & Franssens, 2009 for discussion). For example, in a prior study, 
reasoners’ did not mention the conflict in their think aloud protocols while solving conflict 
problems in a base rate task (De Neys & Glumicic, 2008).  
Other research suggests, however, that conflict detection occurs, but there is a failure to 
execute the inhibition process (De Neys & Franssens, 2009). According to this view, there is a 
level of awareness of the conflict, but for one reason or another, reasoners do not change their 
initial response (e.g., De Neys & Franssens, 2009; Denes-Ray & Epstein, 1994; Sloman, 1996). 
Indeed, researchers have demonstrated this across multiple tasks (De Neys & Franssens, 2009), 
through multiple implicit measures including confidence responses (De Neys, Cromheeke, & 
Osman, 2011); response time (Bonner & Newell, 2010; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Stupple & 
Ball, 2008); memory access (De Neys & Franssens, 2009) and fMRI studies (De Neys, 
Vartanian, & Goel, 2008). In this chapter we will focus on confidence and response time as our 
implicit measures of conflict detection.  
3.1.1. Confidence. Recent research has provided evidence that reasoners demonstrate 
lower confidence in conflict problems compared to no-conflict problems (De Neys et al., 2011). 
This difference in confidence has been taken as a measure of conflict detection based on the 
assumption that, if reasoners detect the conflict, but fail to verbalize it or fail to override their 
initial response, reasoners should express lower confidence in their response. Their results across 
two tasks (base rate and conjunction fallacy) support the viewpoint that reasoners may not 
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override their initial response, despite awareness of a conflict. We anticipated that if there was an 
indication of conflict awareness, confidence would be lower for judgements following conflict 
problems than for judgements following no-conflict problems. 
To examine confidence, we asked individuals to provide subjective judgements regarding 
their performance after each response. Although this method of conflict detection has only been 
used previously in young adults, the same rationale applies to older adults. Specifically, if older 
adults detect conflict, their confidence should be tempered accordingly on conflict problems 
relative to no-conflict problems, regardless of whether they are able to resolve the conflict. In 
contrast, if older adults are unaware of the conflict then confidence should remain the same 
across conflict and no-conflict problems. In addition, participants completed a base rate as well 
as syllogistic reasoning task, we anticipate that if conflict detection is consistent across 
reasoners, then the patterns should be the same for both tasks. It is not possible to examine 
conflict detection for the CRT task because it consists solely of conflict problems; however, for 
the sake of completeness and to examine how compelling each of the CRT problems are, we will 
examine the age-differences in confidence for each of the CRT problems. There are two possible 
outcomes predicted: 1) if older adults are unaware of conflict, their confidence will be high; 2) if 
older adults have awareness of conflict, their confidence may be tempered accordingly.  
3.1.2. Response Time.  An additional measure of conflict detection in the current 
research is latency or response time. Prior research has shown that young adults take longer to 
provide a response to conflict problems than to no-conflict problems (Bonner & Newell, 2010; 
De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Pennycook & Thompson, 2012; Stupple & Ball, 2008; Thompson, 
Prowse Turner, & Pennycook, 2011). This increase in response time has been attributed to 
conflict detection (e.g., De Neys & Glumicic, 2008); because faster response times are thought to 
indicate the faster, Type 1 processing while slower responding is thought to be representative of 
analytic, Type 2 engagement associated with processing that occurs after detection of conflict. 
Consistent with this assumption, it was predicted that for both tasks reasoners would take longer 
for conflict problems than for no-conflict problems. 
3.2. Metacognition 
 An additional goal of this research was to examine the metacognitive ability of 
individuals using measures of calibration, the ability of individuals to match their confidence 
judgements to their performance. For the syllogistic reasoning task, there is an objective measure 
  
45 
 
of performance, namely whether individuals choose the logically valid conclusion; however, for 
the base rate task we used the base rate response as our measure of performance because there is 
no measure of normative accuracy for the base rate task (see Chapter 2 for discussion). Two 
measures of confidence were taken; 1) participants rated their confidence in each item and 2) 
provided a post-hoc estimate of the overall number of correct responses.  
Good calibration is an important aspect of the reasoning process. If reasoners’ confidence 
judgements are high and are not calibrated to their performance, it could be argued that they may 
not engage in Type 2 thinking, because they believe their response is accurate (Pliske & Mutter, 
1996). If older adults are confident in their responses, they may not think it necessary to engage 
in Type 2 thinking to consider alternatives to the compelling intuitive response. If older adults 
demonstrate confidence that does not match their ability, this may explain part of the age-related 
difference in reasoning performance.  
Prior research on calibration in reasoning tasks has indicated that young adults may have 
poor metacognitive ability; they typically express overconfidence in their ability (Prowse Turner 
& Thompson, 2009; Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006). Research on calibration in older adults has 
yet to be conducted in a reasoning task; however, in other domains the available research is 
mixed and appears to be task dependent. For example, Pliske and Mutter (1996) showed that for 
general knowledge tasks, older adults are better calibrated than their younger. However, 
Crawford and Stankov (1996) observed that in tasks examining both fluid and crystallized 
intelligence, both younger and older adults demonstrated overconfidence, but older adults’ to a 
greater extent. Considering that reasoning tasks are comparable to a fluid intelligence test, it is 
possible that older adults will demonstrate overconfidence, thus, exhibiting a poor metacognitive 
ability.  
On the other hand, it has been documented that older adults believe their cognitive 
abilities decline with age (Cavanaugh & Poon, 1989; Hertzog & Dixon, 1994; Hertzog, Saylor, 
Fleece, & Dixon, 1994; Hultsch, Hertzog, & Dixon, 1987, Lineweaver & Hertzog, 1998; 
Perlmutter, 1978; Wells & Esopenko, 2008). Therefore, one could argue that if older adults 
believe this is true, it could impact their subjective assessments by reducing confidence in their 
performance, resulting in good calibration.  
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3.3. Metamemory in Adulthood 
Our final measure of metacognitive ability was a self-report measure of ability. We drew 
from the metamemory literature, because there is no subjective measure of metacognition in 
reasoning. To examine whether reasoner’s beliefs about their cognitive abilities differed with age 
and predicted variance in the age-related reasoning differences, we utilized the Metamemory in 
Adulthood questionnaire as a measure of these beliefs (Dixon & Hultsch, 1983). This instrument 
has multiple subscales and was designed to represent the construct of metamemory in a 
multidimensional way. We had two predictions relating to the Metamemory in Adulthood 
questionnaire. First, older adult participants would report that their cognitive abilities decline 
with age, a finding that has been well-documented (Cavanaugh & Poon, 1989; Hertzog & Dixon, 
1994; Hertzog et al., 1994; Hultsch et al., 1987, Lineweaver & Hertzog, 1998; Perlmutter, 1978; 
Wells & Esopenko, 2008). It was anticipated that, consistent with prior research, older adults 
would have a lower MIA score and lower scores on the task, capacity, change, and locus 
subscales than young adults (Dixon & Hultsch, 1983), suggesting that they do in fact believe 
their abilities decline with age. More importantly, this measure was expected to contribute to a 
portion of the age-related variance in reasoning that was not accounted for by previous factors 
(i.e., education, verbal ability, working memory, processing speed, inhibition, and thinking 
dispositions; Chapter 2).  
3.4. Cues to Confidence 
 In addition to the variables discussed in Chapter 2, we were also interested in whether 
older and younger adults would be equally sensitive to two additional factors that are related to 
confidence (i.e., the believability of the conclusion, latency, and perceived task difficulty).  
3.4.1. Conclusion believability. It was demonstrated in the previous chapter that both 
younger and older adults struggle with neutral problems. One possible explanation for this 
finding is that there is no strongly cued response based on belief (i.e., believability of the 
syllogisms or stereotypical information in the base rate problems), in neutral problems. Prior 
research has demonstrated that reasoners are more confident when decisions can be based on 
belief, then when such cues are not available (Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006). If reasoners are 
relying on belief information to make their judgement, this should be reflected in lower 
confidence judgements for the neutral problems, than confidence expressed for the conflict and 
no-conflict problems. Also, if a decrease in confidence in the neutral problems is present, we 
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have additional evidence that the decrease in confidence is related to a degree of uncertainty 
present in the reasoners and that reasoners are using belief as a cue to confidence.   
 3.4.2. Latency. Previous research has demonstrated that latency (RT) is also a cue to 
confidence, in both children (Ackerman & Zalmanov, 2012) and young adults (Thompson et al., 
2011). This is demonstrated by a negative correlation between response time and confidence, 
such that the longer reasoners spend on the problem, the less confident they are. Our goal was to 
extend this investigation to older adults to determine if these findings are age-invariant.  
3.5. Additional Measure of Confidence 
Difficulty. Finally, we also assessed reasoners perceived difficulty of the task as a 
measure of global confidence. There is research to support the idea that task difficulty has an 
impact on performance (Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006), however a direct measure of this has 
yet to be taken. Thus, we asked participants directly to describe the difficulty of each task. If 
individuals’ perceived difficulty of the task is related to performance, we expect that as 
perceived difficulty increases performance will decrease. It is also predicted that the higher the 
perceived difficulty of the task, the longer it will take participants to respond. This hypothesis is 
based on the assumption that task difficulty and the likelihood of analytic engagement (which is 
assumed to take additional time) should be positively correlated.  
 
3.6. Method 
3.6.1. Participants 
 The same seventy-two younger adults (46 female) (M = 24.6 years; SD = 7.54) and 
seventy-two older adults (55 female) (M = 80.0 years, SD = 7.28) described in Chapter 2 were 
analyzed in this chapter
4
.   
 
3.6.2. Materials and Procedure 
The materials, stimuli, and procedure used to assess performance were described in 
Chapter 2.   
 
 
                                                 
4
  These participants scored in the above average range on a measure of verbal ability and therefore might not be 
highly representative of the average young or older adult.  
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3.6.3. Confidence Judgements. For all three reasoning tasks, following each response, 
participants were asked to rate their confidence in the correctness of their judgement on the 
following scale: How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
0%     10%     20%     30%     40%     50%     60%     70%     80%     90%     100% 
   Not at all                                                  Moderately                                               Extremely 
 After solving all of the problems for the syllogistic and base rate tasks, reasoners were 
asked the following additional questions.  
1) You have just completed 12 problems.  Of these 12 answers, how many do you believe 
you answered correctly?   
2) Judging your overall performance on this task, how do you think you would score 
relative to the others who have completed this task?  You will score better than                                     
0-10%    10-20    20-30    30-40   40-50    50-60    60-70    70-80    80-90    90-100%                     
of the others who have completed the task.
5
 
3) On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 corresponding to extremely easy and 10 corresponding to 
extremely difficult, please evaluate the difficulty of the reasoning task that you just 
completed. 
3.7. Results 
The data are reported in several sections. The first section reports the ANOVAs for the 
confidence and RT data to test the hypotheses regarding the role of prior beliefs in confidence 
and conflict detection. The second section contains the calibration analyses for the syllogistic and 
base rate tasks to examine the role of metacognition in age differences in reasoning performance. 
Third, we report the results for the MIA. Finally, the analyses regarding latency and perceived 
difficulty as cues to confidence are reported.  
3.7.1. Confidence in the Syllogistic Task 
 A 2 (age group) x 3 (problem type) mixed factors ANOVA was computed for the 
confidence scores, to test two hypotheses: 1) reasoners would use the believability of the 
conclusion as a cue to confidence and 2) that lower confidence would be reported for conflict 
problems than for no-conflict problems, if reasoners detected conflict. The mean levels of 
confidence for older and younger adults as a function of problem type on the syllogistic task are 
plotted in Figure 3.1. Overall, older (M = 71.99) and younger adults (M = 73.56) were equally 
                                                 
5
 This question was eliminated from the analysis. 
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confident in their performance on the syllogistic task, F (1, 142) = .31, MSE = 858.45, p = .577 
ηp
2
 = .002; however, there was an interaction between age and problem type, F (2, 284) = 5.13, 
MSE = 80.03, p = .006, ηp
2
 = .035. Young adults were equally confident on all problems, t ≥ -
.143, SE ≥ 1.21, p ≥ .098; however, older adults were equally confident on conflict (M = 73.61) 
and no-conflict problems (M = 75.00) [t (71) = 1.13, SE = 1.23, p = .262], and more confident 
on both of these problems than on neutral (M = 67.34) [t (71) ≥ -3.49, SE ≥ 1.71, p ≤ .001]. That 
is, when the believability of the conclusions was available as a cue (i.e., for conflict and no-
conflict problems), reasoners were more confident in their responses than when believability was 
not present.  
 
Figure 3.1. Confidence Values for the Syllogistic Task as a Function of Problem Type and 
        Age. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Note. Error bars represent the standard error. 
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It has been argued (e.g., De Neys et al., 2011) that conflict detection should, in theory, 
lower confidence. The fact that both age groups had similar levels of confidence between 
conflict and no-conflict problems suggests reasoners may not detect conflict in a syllogistic task. 
Surprisingly, when the analysis is broken down by correct versus incorrect responses, reasoners 
were more confident when providing a correct response (M = 74.55) than when providing an 
incorrect response (M = 69.49), t (141) = 5.69, p < .001. Thus, when reasoners say “yes” to valid 
and “no” to invalid problems they are more confident than when they provide an incorrect 
response, regardless of whether the problem is conflict, no-conflict, or neutral. This pattern holds 
for both young and older adults, p < .001.  
In sum, older, but surprisingly not younger, adults were more confident when they could 
use beliefs to make a decision, than when belief cues were absent. Neither group’s judgements 
were sensitive to conflict, suggesting that on this task, people may not be aware that two 
alternative answers are possible. One possibility for this finding is that the logic of the task is 
more complex (e.g., task consists of multiple-model problems and non-words, including 
argonelles), than tasks where sensitivity to conflict has previously been observed. It is also 
possible that reasoners do not possess the mindware, the knowledge of logical rules (Stanovich, 
2009), necessary to realize their beliefs are in conflict with the logical rules of the task.  
3.7.2. Confidence in the Base Rate Task.  
To test the hypotheses that a) reasoners would use the stereotypical information as a cue 
to confidence and b) that lower confidence would be reported for conflict problems than for no-
conflict problems, we computed another 2 (age) x 3 (problem type) ANOVA. The mean levels of 
confidence for older and younger adults as a function of problem type for the base rate task are 
plotted in Figure 3.2. Overall, older adults (M = 74.20) were marginally less confident than 
younger adults (M = 78.60) on the base rate task, F (1, 142) = 3.27, MSE = 638.70, p = .073, ηp
2
 
= .022. Consistent with the idea that conflict detection lowers confidence, there was a main effect 
of problem type, [F (1.69, 239.99) = 75.25, MSE = 122.72, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .346], such that 
participants were the most confident on problems with no conflict (M = 83.40), followed by 
problems with conflict (M = 77.07), and were least confident on neutral problems (M = 68.73), t 
≥ 6.07, SE ≥ 0.92, p < .001. These findings are consistent with the syllogistic task and prior 
research (Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006) and suggest that the ability to make judgements on the 
basis of belief (e.g., stereotypical information) is a strong cue to confidence. There was no 
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interaction between age and problem type, F (2, 284) = .786, MSE = 103.71, p = .457, ηp
2
 = .006, 
meaning that older adults were not particularly more reliant on beliefs, than younger adults.  
 
Figure 3.2. Confidence Values for the Base Rate Task as a Function of Problem Type and 
       Age.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Note. Error bars represent the standard error. 
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71.85), t (127) = 4.40, SE = 1.15, p < .001. Thus, when reasoners provide a stereotypical 
response, there is evidence to suggest that they are aware this response may not be warranted.  
3.7.3. Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) 
 The confidence data for the CRT were analysed as a 3 (problem) x 2 (age-group) mixed 
ANOVA, with age as the between-subjects variable. Data are presented in Figure 3.3. Older 
adults were less confident (M = 74.14) than young adults (M = 87.99), F (1, 140) = 18.83, MSE = 
1083.77, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .119. Confidence also varied as a function of problem with confidence 
being higher for the bat and ball problem (M = 91.42), than for the widget (M = 77.41) and lily 
pad (M = 74.36) problems, F (1.89, 263.98) = 27.04, MSE = 460.97, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .162. This 
pattern was the same for both age groups, F (2, 280) = 1.95, MSE = 434.58, p = .144, ηp
2
 = .014. 
One interpretation of this finding is that the initial response for the bat and ball problem is more 
compelling than the initial responses for the other two problems. This assumption is supported 
by the accuracy results (see Chapter 2), because both young and older adults’ accuracy on the bat 
and ball problem was lower than the other problems
6
. Taken together, these results suggest that 
reasoners are not considering that there might be an alternative answer.  
Overall, these results suggest that reasoners are sensitive to conflict on the base rate task, 
but not the syllogistic task. These results also suggest that the believability of the conclusion 
(based on belief or stereotypical information) provides reasoners with a cue to confidence.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 For young adults, there was no significant difference between performance on the bat and ball and widget 
problems. 
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Figure 3.3. Confidence Scores on the CRT as a Function of Problem and Age.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Note. Error bars represent the standard error. 
 
3.7.4. Response Time 
Another measure of conflict detection is response time (RT). If reasoners detect and try to 
resolve conflict, then RT should be longer for conflict than for no-conflict problems. All RT 
measures were converted to log
10
 prior to analysis. There were no RT data for the paper and 
pencil CRT task
7
.  
 3.7.4.1. Syllogistic Task RT. The mean RTs for older and younger adults as a function of 
problem type are plotted in Figure 3.4. Not surprisingly, older adults were slower at responding 
(M = 32.96 sec) than the young adults (M = 24.25 sec), F (1, 142) = 7.25, MSE = .150, p = .008. 
RT did not vary as a function of problem type, p = .810, nor did it interact with age, p = .102
8
. 
                                                 
7
 It should be noted that although RT for older adults was recorded when the experimenter pressed the response key, 
the experimenter was blind to the questions on the screen. Thus, any age-related RT differences should be attributed 
age and not experimenter bias. Any additional RT from the experimenter would be small and constant across all 
problems. 
 
8
 When the data are analysed using the validity by belief factorial structure, the data replicate past findings that RT is 
the longest for invalid-believable problems (Thompson, Streimer, Reikoff, Gunter, & Campbell, 2003). 
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These results are consistent with the confidence data and provide further evidence that reasoners 
may not detect conflict in a syllogistic task.  
 
Figure 3.4.  Response Time (RT) Means for the Syllogistic Task as a Function of Age and 
         Problem Type.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Note. Error bars represent the standard error. 
 
3.7.4.2. Base rate RT. The mean RTs for older and younger adults as a function of 
problem type are plotted in Figure 3.5. Older adults were slower to respond on the base rate task 
(M = 33.7sec) than younger adults (M = 22.0 sec), F(1, 142) = 53.98, MSE = .060, p < .001. 
Response time also varied as a function of problem type, where neutral problems took longer to 
solve (M = 31.9 sec) compared to conflict (M = 26.0 sec) and no conflict problems (M = 25.9 
sec), which took equal time to solve, F (1.77, 251.75) = 42.81, MSE = .007, p < .001. These two 
effects were qualified by an interaction between problem type and age, F (2, 284) = 9.21, MSE = 
.007, p < .001. Although the pattern was similar for both age groups (i.e., conflict and no conflict 
took equal amounts of time to solve, p ≥ .127, and neutral took the longest time to solve, p < 
No Conflict
R
es
p
o
n
se
 T
im
e 
(s
ec
o
n
d
s)
0
10
20
30
40
50
Younger Adults
Older Adults
Conflict Neutral
 
  
55 
 
.001), the response time difference between the conflict and no conflict problems compared to 
neutral problems for young adults was approximately 2.5 seconds, whereas for older adults it 
was 10 seconds.  
 
Figure 3.5.  Response Time (RT) Means for the Base Rate Task as a Function of Age and 
         Problem Type.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Note. Error bars represent the standard error. 
 
If longer RTs reflect additional processing, it can be concluded that neutral problems took 
longer for young and older adults to solve than the other problems because they required 
additional analytic processing in order to come to a response. The fact that there was no 
difference between conflict and no conflict problems suggests that reasoners are sensitive to the 
conflict in terms of confidence, but are not attempting to resolve it, which would take time. In 
fact, these results are at odds with previous base rate data that showed conflict problems take 
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longer to solve than no-conflict problems (e.g., De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; Pennycook & 
Thompson, 2012; Thompson et al., 2011.  
Careful examination of the items used revealed an anomalous item, which may have 
distorted the findings. The following problem may have been treated as a neutral problem rather 
than as a no-conflict problem:  
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 996 kindergarten 
teachers and 4 executive managers. Lilly is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Lilly is 
37 years old. She is married and has 3 kids. Her husband is a veterinarian. She is committed to 
her family and always watches the daily cartoon shows with her kids. What is most likely?  
(A) Lilly is a kindergarten teacher  
(B) Lilly is an executive manager  
 
Examination of the confidence and response time data for the problem revealed that 
participants responded differently to this problem than the other no-conflict problems. 
Participants took a very long time to solve this problem (significantly longer than all other no-
conflict problems), t (143) ≥ 5.28, SE ≥ .14, p < .001, and were less confident on this problem 
than all other no-conflict problems, t (143) ≥ 3.32, SE ≥ 1.28, p ≤ .001. When this problem was 
removed, the RT results are consistent with previous research on young adults: neutral > 
conflict > no-conflict, t (71) ≥ 2.23, SE ≥ .11, p ≤ .029. The older adults’ RT data revealed the 
same pattern, conflict = no-conflict < neutral, regardless of inclusion or exclusion of the Lilly 
problem. Further evidence to support the argument that this no-conflict problem may not be 
fitting the criterion comes from unreported results from Pennycook & Thompson (2012). They 
found that when asked to rate the probability that Lilly is a kindergarten teacher, based just on 
the description, that the ratings were closer to 50 than to 100 (where 100 would demonstrate a 
strong stereotypical belief that Lilly was a kindergarten teacher) (M = 61.78)
9
, whereas the other 
no-conflict problems elicited ratings closer to 100. It is possible that the stereotype in this 
problem is not as compelling for young adults, than the stereotypes in the other no-conflict 
problems. Indeed, confidence for this problem was lower than for all of the other no-conflict 
                                                 
9
 This value was based on the mean responses from a two response paradigm (see Pennycook & Thompson, 2012 
for explanation), where the mean 1
st
 response was 57.97 and the mean 2
nd
 response was 65.60.  
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problems, t (143) ≥ 3.32, SE ≥ 1.28, p ≤ .001. Furthermore, when this problem is removed from 
the confidence analysis, there results remain the same.  
 
3.7.5. Calibration 
To compare metacognitive skills for old and young adults, we computed correlations 
between confidence and accuracy for each age group, for each task. In addition, we computed 
calibration scores and analysed them between age groups, with multiple t-tests. Calibration 
measures the extent to which confidence reflects accuracy
10
. We compared old and young adults 
on two measures of calibration, which are described in detail below. In order to compute 
calibration a measure of performance was necessary. For the syllogistic reasoning task, 
performance was defined in terms of accuracy (i.e., the proportion of trial that participants 
responded “yes” to valid problems and saying “no” to invalid problems). For the base rate task, 
we used the proportion of base rate responses chosen as a way of measuring performance. 
Calibration scores were not computed for the CRT because of the low number of problems 
within this task (3) and because, reasoners were not asked to provide an estimated number 
correct following this task.  
 3.7.5.1. Correlations. To determine whether there was a relationship between confidence 
and performance, we computed correlations between mean confidence scores and mean 
performance scores. Consistent with prior research (Prowse Turner & Thompson, 2009; 
Shynkaruk & Thompson, 2006), the correlation between confidence and accuracy on the 
syllogistic task for young adults, was low and not-significant, r = .196, p = .098, and this pattern 
held for the older adults, r = .176, p = .140. When we computed correlations between confidence 
and the tendency to provide the base rate response, the results were significant for young adults, 
r = .471, p < .001, but not for older adults, r = .169, p = .157. These correlations suggest that 
young adults’ confidence was related to performance on the base rate task, but not on the 
syllogistic task.  
3.7.5.2. Item by Item Calibration. To obtain the first calibration score, item by item 
calibration, we computed a correlation for each participant, between item by item confidence 
judgements and accuracy.  To test whether reasoners were better calibrated for the compelling 
                                                 
10
 Accuracy for the base-rate task is a bit of a misnomer because it is not possible to derive a measure of normative 
accuracy for these data (see explanation in Chapter 1; also Pennycook, Fugelsang, Koehler, 2012; Thompson et al., 
2011); however for the purpose of these analyses the number of base-rate responses will be termed accuracy.  
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problems (i.e., conflict and no-conflict), than on all problems, this score was computed for all 
problems and then again excluding neutral problems. We anticipated that reasoners with better 
calibration would have a better metacognitive ability.  
3.7.5.2.1. Syllogistic Reasoning Task. The correlation between accuracy and confidence 
for all problems did not differ between younger (M = .16) and older adults (M = .13), p = 
.646. This pattern was similar when the neutral problems were excluded, however, there 
was a trend towards an age difference between younger (M = .20) and older (M = .09) 
adults, p = .094. Even though these correlations are all significantly greater than 0, t ≥ 
2.21, p ≤ .030, they are quite small and roughly similar for young and old adults, and 
indicate that reasoners’ ability to estimate confidence on an item by item basis is not 
precise.  
3.7.5.2.2. Base Rate Task. The pattern of results for the base rate task was identical to the 
syllogistic task. There was no difference between younger (M = .20) and older adults (M 
= .13) on item by item correlations for all problems, p = .234; nor was there a difference 
between young (M = .22) and older adults (M = .13) when neutral problems were 
excluded, p = .202. Again, these correlations were all greater than 0, t ≥ 3.00, p ≤ .004, 
but too small to conclude that reasoners are effective at calibrating on an item by item 
basis. 
In sum, it does not appear that reasoners have the metacognitive ability to calibrate 
themselves on an item by item basis, regardless of age and task.  
3.7.5.3. Global Calibration. The second score that we computed was called global 
calibration. Global calibration is the difference between the estimated number correct (out of 12) 
– total number correct. The data are presented in Table 3.1.  
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Table 3.1  
Global Calibration Means for the Syllogistic and Base rate Tasks.  
Syllogistic Reasoning Task 
 Young Adults Old Adults  
Overall       -1.03          -.38 t(117.11)=-1.31, p = .193 
Overestimators        1.55          2.90 t(46.78)=-3.11, p = .001 
Underestimators       -2.63         -3.35 t(45.99)=1.54, p = .130 
Base Rate Task 
 Young Adults Old Adults  
Overall        .54          1.07 t(142)=-1.14, p = .257 
Overestimators       2.42          3.18 t(76)=-1.99, p = .050 
Underestimators      -2.79         -2.50 t(37)=-.579, p = .566 
 
3.7.5.3.1. Syllogistic Reasoning Task: At first glance, it appears that both younger and 
older adults are fairly accurate at assessing their global performance because there was no 
difference between their global calibration scores; however, the difference between the estimate 
and total correct was significantly different than 0 for the young adults, p < .001, and there was 
no difference for the older adults, p = .381. This result suggests that only the older adults were 
accurate in assessing their global performance. However, when the data were split into 
overestimators and underestimators, older adults (n = 22) who overestimated their ability, do so 
to a greater extent than the younger adults (n = 30); however, there is no difference between 
young (n = 41) and old (n = 34) adults who underestimated their ability.  
3.7.5.3.2. Base Rate Task. Consistent with the syllogistic task, examination of global 
calibration revealed no overall difference between young and old adults. Contrary to the 
syllogistic task though, the global calibration scores differed from 0 for both groups (young p = 
.080; old p = .003).  Also, for this task, both young and older adults overestimate their 
performance on average, whereas both groups underestimate their performance on the syllogistic 
task. Again, older adults who overestimated their ability (n = 40), did so to a greater extent than 
the younger adults (n = 38) and there was no difference between young (n = 19) and old (n = 20) 
adults who underestimated their ability. Fifteen younger and twelve older adults were able to 
assess their global performance with 100% accuracy.  
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Consistent with the correlation and item by item data, reasoners do not show evidence for 
metacognitive ability in terms of calibration. Reasoners, systematically over- or underestimate 
performance, with little evidence for differences between age groups.   
 
3.7.6. Metamemory in Adulthood (MIA) 
 The questions on the MIA were reverse coded and the values were summed to create the 
total MIA score. There are 108 questions and a total possible value of 5 on each question. Scores 
ranged from 274 to 444, with the highest possible score of 540. One older adult failed to 
complete all of the questions and was excluded from the analysis. Young adults had a 
significantly higher average MIA total score (M = 379.13; SD = 25.71) compared to the older 
adults (M = 356.10; SD = 25.15), t (141) = 5.41, p < .001. This finding is consistent with 
previous findings on the MIA (Dixon & Hultsch, 1983) and suggests that young adults report 
having a better metamemory than older adults.  As described below (see Table 3.2), the MIA 
data were broken down into the 8 respective subscales for subsequent age group comparisons 
using independent t-tests.  
 
Table 3.2 
Means for Each Subscale of the MIA. 
 Young Adults Older Adults p-value 
Internal (9 questions) 31.93 (4.47) 30.58 (4.20) p = .064 
External (9 questions) 31.29 (7.05) 35.18 (4.40) p < .001 
Task (16 questions) 65.75 (5.94) 62.59 (4.66) p = .001 
Capacity (17 questions) 59.15 (9.07) 49.94 (9.06) p < .001 
Change (18 questions) 58.31 (10.79) 46.49 (9.86) p < .001 
Locus (9 questions) 32.03 (5.63) 29.14 (4.77) p = .001 
Anxiety (14 questions) 41.32 (10.01) 43.08 (8.69) p = .262 
Achievement (16 questions) 59.35 (6.90) 59.08 (5.80) p = .806 
Note. Standard Deviations in parentheses 
  
 Consistent with prior research, young adults scored higher on the task, capacity, change 
and locus subscales of the MIA than older adults (Dixon & Hultsch, 1983). These results provide 
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further evidence that young adults report greater knowledge about their basic memory processes 
and memory capacity, a stronger belief in memory stability across time, and greater control over 
remembering abilities compared to older adults. Indeed, it is well documented that older adults 
believe they have a poor memory capacity and tend to avoid cognitive activities on the basis of 
this belief (Cavanaugh & Poon, 1989; Hertzog & Dixon, 1994; Hertzog et al., 1994; Hultsch et 
al., 1987, Lineweaver & Hertzog, 1998; Perlmutter, 1978; Wells & Esopenko, 2008. It is also not 
surprising that older adults report lower scores on the change subscale because they have likely 
witnessed declines in their memory to some extent, whereas young adults may not have had this 
experience.  
 Older adults scored higher on the external subscale than young adults, which 
demonstrates that older adults make use of a greater number of memory strategies (e.g., writing 
appointments on a calendar). This finding is inconsistent with Dixon and Hultsch (1983); 
however, the older adults in this study were higher than average on verbal ability and education 
and perhaps these two factors contribute to an understanding of the effectiveness of strategies.  
Also consistent with previous research, older and younger adults did not differ on the 
internal subscale, anxiety or achievement (Dixon & Hultsch, 1983). Young relative to older 
adults reported they had the same knowledge regarding how emotion can influence cognitive 
performance and the importance of having a good memory and performing well on cognitive 
tasks.  
3.7.6.1. Correlation Analyses. Correlations were computed to examine if there were 
relationships among total MIA score, confidence on the syllogistic and base rate tasks, 
performance on the syllogistic or base rate tasks, AOT scores, RT, or the CRT, for either 
younger or older adults. For both the syllogistic and base rate tasks, there were no correlations 
between the MIA and confidence, performance or RT, for either age group. Scores on the MIA 
were unrelated to confidence and performance on the CRT and were unrelated to scores on the 
AOT.  
3.7.6.2. Regression Analyses. To determine whether the total MIA score contributed to 
any of the remaining age-related variance in performance on the three tasks (see Chapter 2 for 
discussion), the total MIA score was entered in to the regression analysis following the AOT and 
age was entered last. These data are presented in Table 3.3. 
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        Table 3.3 
        Hierarchical Regressions for the Syllogistic Task, Base Rate Task, and the CRT.  
Conflict SR 
problems 
Conflict BR 
problems 
Neutral BR 
problems 
CRT 
R
2
 change for age after Chapter 2 variables entered 
.070 .006 .019 .002 
R
2 
change for age after all variables and MIA entered 
.063 .002 .018 .002 
R
2
 for age alone 
.266** .130** .115** .191** 
Note. Only the problem types that had a significant regression equation in Chapter 2 were 
examined further.  
* p < .05; ** p ≤ .001; a p < .10 
 
     The addition of the MIA did not account for additional residual variance in conflict syllogistic 
problems, conflict or neutral base rate problems, or the CRT. These results suggest that older, 
relative to young adults, expressed lower beliefs in their metamemory (i.e., lower total MIA 
scores), but these beliefs did not contribute unique variance to the age-related differences in 
reasoning performance.  
 
3.7.7. Latency as a Cue to Confidence.  To test the hypothesis that latency would be a cue to 
confidence for both young and older adults, we computed correlations between confidence and 
response time for both the syllogistic and base rate tasks. Consistent with prior research 
(Ackerman & Zalmanov, 2012; Thompson et al., 2012), the correlations between confidence and 
response time, for both age groups, on both the syllogistic task (young: r = -.34; older: r = -.30) 
and for the base rate task (young: r = -.40; older: r = -.37), were significantly different from 0, t ≤ 
-6.77, p < .001. The negative correlation implies that the longer reasoners took to solve the 
problem, the less confident they were and this pattern held when the neutral problems were 
excluded, t ≤ -5.56, p < .001.   
 
3.7.8. Perceived Task Difficulty on the Syllogistic Task. Older (M = 7.50) and younger adults 
(M = 7.03) judged this task to be equally difficult, t (129.36) = 1.49, p = .138. Consistent with 
our assumption that perceived difficulty was another measure of confidence, perceived difficulty 
was correlated with overall confidence and confidence on each of the problem types, r ≥ -.278, p 
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≤ .001. The results also supported the predictions that performance would decrease as perceived 
difficulty increased (r = -.159, p = .057) and that individuals will take longer to respond if the 
perceived difficulty is judged to be high (r = .385, p < .001). 
  
3.7.9. Perceived Task Difficulty on the Base Rate Task. Unlike the syllogistic task, older 
adults judged the base rate task (M = 5.89) to be more difficult than young adults (M = 4.47), t 
(142) = 3.90, p < .001. In addition, both groups judged this task to be easier than the syllogistic 
task, p < .001. As with the syllogistic task, confidence decreased as perceived difficulty 
increased. The smallest correlation occurred with the no-conflict problems, r = -.182, p = .029 
and the largest with the neutral problems, r = -.273, p = .001.  Also consistent with the syllogistic 
task, performance decreased, as perceived difficulty increased (r = -.277, p = .001) and the 
greater the perceived difficulty, the longer it took participants to respond (r = .326, p < .001). 
These data suggest that although reasoners spend more time on the syllogistic or base rate task, if 
they perceive it to be difficult, this does not translate into better performance.  
 
3.7.10. Additional Factors. Regression analyses were conducted for confidence on the 
syllogistic task, base rate task, and the CRT, to determine whether the predictors of performance 
(see Chapter 2) were similar to the predictors of confidence. In this case, we entered all variables 
in one multiple regression because there is no prior research to suggest a hierarchical regression 
for the confidence data. The regression equation was not significant for either the syllogistic task,  
R
2
 = .069, F (7, 137) = 1.37, MSE = 271.52, p = .225, or for the base rate task, R
2
 = .028, F (7, 
137) = 1.56, MSE = 213.83, p = .153, providing further evidence that performance and 
confidence are predicted by different variables (Prowse Turner & Thompson, 2009; Shynkaruk 
& Thompson, 2006).  
The CRT revealed a different pattern; the factors predicted 23% of the variance in CRT 
confidence, R
2
 = .230, F (7, 137) = 5.55, MSE = 344.71, p < .001. Inhibition (b = -.295, t (137) = 
-3.39, p = .001), processing speed (b = .289, t (137) = 2.12, p = .036), and verbal ability (b = -
.207, t (137) = -2.50, p = .014) accounted for significant unique variance in confidence on the 
CRT. In addition, education was a marginally significant predictor, b = .176, t (137) = 1.81, p = 
.072. This implies that the some of the factors that cue confidence in the CRT are different than 
those for the syllogistic and base rate tasks. One possibility is that the factors that cue confidence 
  
64 
 
on the CRT are related to the ability to perform the task, whereas the cues for confidence in the 
other tasks may be task-related (e.g., latency).  
To rule out the possibility that individuals with higher levels of intellectual ability are 
naturally more likely to engage in intellectually challenging activities and to be more confident 
about their skills than individuals with lower levels of intellectual ability, verbal ability scores 
were correlated with the scores on the MIA, AOT, and confidence on the syllogistic task, base 
rate task, and the CRT. None of the correlations were significant, r ≤ -.154, p ≥ .066, which 
suggests that this is not the case.   
 
3.8. Discussion 
In Chapter 2, we demonstrated that both the algorithmic and reflective components of the 
analytic system explained age-related variance in reasoning performance; however, these factors 
only accounted for, at most, 33% of the variance. Our goal in the current paper was to determine 
if these age-related differences could also be attributed to metacognitive differences. 
Specifically, we tested four different junctures where this might be the case; conflict detection, 
confidence in individual answers and overall performance, and self-report measure of 
metacognitive ability. In the case of conflict detection, older and young adults performed 
similarly, except in a few instances. In terms of our calibration measures, there were minor 
differences between older and younger adults and thus, little evidence to suggest that this 
measure of metacognitive ability could explain the differences between young and older adults’ 
performance. Finally, older adults expressed less belief in their metamemory than young adults, 
but this difference did not explain any of the age-related differences in reasoning. In sum, it 
appears that differences in metacognitive abilities do not explain age-related differences in 
reasoning. It was also revealed that conclusion believability and latency were cues to confidence 
and that perceived task difficulty, an additional measure of confidence, was related to 
performance and RT on both the syllogistic and base rate tasks.  
3.8.1. Conflict Detection. The confidence and response time data do not indicate that 
either group was sensitive to the conflict in the syllogistic task, because there were no differences 
between conflict and no-conflict problems for either variable. However, reasoners appeared to be 
sensitive to the accuracy of their response; confidence was higher for both conflict and no-
conflict problems when reasoners provided the correct response than when they provided the 
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initial intuitive response. These results suggest that the age-related differences in reasoning on 
the syllogistic task cannot be due age differences in conflict detection. The most likely 
explanation for the inability of reasoners to detect conflict is the difficult nature of the task. The 
problems included were multiple-model problems and all problems contained non-words (e.g., 
argonelles). By increasing the difficulty of the task, it is possible that the reasoners do not 
possess the knowledge of logical rules or the mindware (Stanovich, 2009) to realize their beliefs 
are in conflict with these rules.  
Assuming that reasoners are less confident when they detect a conflict between two 
answers, we have evidence to show that older and young adults detect conflict on the base rate 
task; both groups were more confident on no-conflict than on conflict problems. Once the 
anomalous problem is removed, the response time data give a similar picture for the younger 
adults. Young adults took longer to respond to the conflict problems, than to the no conflict 
problems, which suggests that young adults were sensitive to the conflict. The fact that older 
adults’ performance is low on conflict problems and that response time is not longer for conflict 
problems suggests that that older adults may be sensitive to the conflict (i.e., confidence lower on 
conflict than no-conflict problems), but that they do not attempt to resolve the conflict. It is also 
possible that the general cognitive slowing discussed in Chapter 2 may eliminate the sensitivity 
of response time as an indicator.  Regardless, on the base rate task both younger and older adults 
do not seem to be caught up in the dilemma afforded by the conflict. Collectively, the conflict 
detection results suggest that conflict detection, if present, does not trigger successful T2 
intervention in either young or old adults. These results do not lend support to the conclusion that 
age-related reasoning differences may be related to conflict detection.     
3.8.2. Metacognitive Ability. There is a limited degree to which we can use the 
metacognitive ability data to explain age-related variance in reasoning. There were no major 
differences in the correlations or calibration measures, and it appears that both young and old 
adults have poor metacognitive ability. The only indication that there may be calibration between 
confidence and performance was the fact that reasoners were more confident for correct and base 
rate responses than for incorrect or stereotypical responses. Also, there was a correlation between 
the tendency to choose base rate responses and confidence for the young adults. These results 
suggest that reasoners, young or old, were fairly confident in their responses and may not have 
believed it necessary to engage in analytic thought to consider the other answer. In sum, poor 
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metacognitive ability cannot explain part of the age-related difference in reasoning performance 
because there were no major differences between young and older adults. 
3.8.3. Metamemory in Adulthood.  Individuals who stated they were more cognitively 
active and have stronger beliefs regarding the strength of their memory, as measured by the 
MIA, tended to be more confident and perform better on some cognitive tasks than individuals 
who did not hold these beliefs; however, these beliefs did not contribute to age-related variance 
in any of the reasoning tasks. Thus, although older adults believe that their cognitive abilities 
decline with age, these beliefs do not predict age-related variance in reasoning performance.  
3.8.4. Cues to Confidence. We also provided further evidence that conclusion 
believability is a cue to confidence (Prowse Turner & Thompson, 2009; Shynkaruk & 
Thompson, 2006). Across both tasks, young and older adults were less confident on the neutral 
problems
11
 than on either conflict or no-conflict problems. Without belief information (i.e., 
believability of the conclusion or stereotypical information), reasoners slow down and decrease 
their confidence. Latency is also a strong cue to confidence for both young and older adults. The 
longer it took participants to respond, the less confident they were in their response. These 
results demonstrate that the confidence in older adults’ responses can be related to the time it 
takes to retrieve or select it, which adds to the current literature that has shown this in children 
and young adults (Ackerman & Zalmanov, 2012; Kelley & Lindsay, 1993; Thompson et al., 
2011). We can conclude from these findings that older and younger adults use similar cues to 
confidence, suggesting that metacognitive processes are similar for both age groups.  
3.8.5. Perceived Difficulty. Furthermore, perceived difficulty of the task was related to 
performance and the average time it took reasoners to respond. That is, as the perceived 
difficulty of the task increased, reasoners provided less correct responses and less base rate 
responses and took longer to respond. Interestingly, older adults reported that the syllogistic task 
was harder than the base rate task, yet expressed very similar levels of confidence across the two 
tasks.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11
  The difference was marginally significant for young adults on the syllogistic task, p = .098. 
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3.8.6. Conclusions and Direction for Chapter 4.  There was little evidence to suggest 
that younger and older adults differ in metacognition. Young and old adults demonstrated similar 
levels of conflict detection and low levels of metacognitive ability (i.e., the ability to accurately 
assess their performance). In addition, both groups use similar cues to confidence (i.e., 
conclusion believability and latency).  With regards to the dual-process theory of reasoning and 
aging, our results do not suggest that aspects of monitoring and metacognitive processes can 
explain age-related differences in reasoning. On the syllogistic task, it does not appear that 
reasoners are sensitive to conflict and consequently, performance remains low. On the base rate 
task, it appears that reasoners may be aware of the conflict, but choose not to engage T2 
thinking. If reasoners were prompted to engage in analytic thinking, we could test the hypothesis 
that age-related differences in reasoning abilities could, in part, be due to a failure of older adults 
to fully exploit their analytic reasoning capacity; a possibility that is explored in Chapter 4.  
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Chapter 4 
Can Instructions to Reason from an Objective Perspective Moderate the Age-related Difference 
in Reasoning? 
 
Abstract 
To test the hypothesis that a simple strategy of taking another’s perspective could be effective in 
countering some aspects of the age-related differences in reasoning, reasoners were asked to 
adopt an alternative perspective when reasoning. This manipulation could encourage reasoners to 
engage in a more analytic style when prompted to do so. Seventy-two older (M = 80.0 years) and 
72 younger (M = 24.6 years) adults completed a syllogistic reasoning task, responding to 
problems from their perspective and from the perspective of the writer. Confidence ratings were 
also recorded. The manipulation did not improve performance for the young adults, in fact it 
hindered their performance; however, reasoning after switching from one’s own perspective to 
the writer’s perspective improved older adults‘ performance on conflict problems (i.e., logic and 
belief lead to different responses). These findings suggest that asking older adults to switch 
perspectives may cue them to engage analytic thinking, which is consistent with the hypothesis 
that age-related differences in reasoning abilities may be, in part, due to a failure of older adults 
to fully exploit their analytic reasoning capacity.  
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Can Instructions to Reason from an Objective Perspective Moderate the Age-related Difference 
in Reasoning? 
In Chapter 2, we demonstrated that older adults are inclined to provide intuitive responses 
more often than young adults. This response tendency leads to lower performance on conflict 
problems than on the no-conflict problems. The goal of the current paper was to examine 
whether this difference reflects the propensity to rely on Type 1 or Type 2 output (i.e., strategy 
choice) or the limited success with which Type 2 thinking is implemented (i.e., capacity 
limitations). One way to test this is to implement a perspective manipulation in which 
participants are asked to reason about information from someone else’s perspective versus one’s 
own. It has been proposed that shifting perspectives allows participants to differentiate between 
the writer’s intentions and their own beliefs (Thompson, Evans, & Handley, 2005).  From a dual-
process viewpoint, having participants reason from a perspective other than their own (e.g., 
writer) requires them to engage in analytic thinking (Beatty & Thompson, 2012; Thompson et 
al., 2005). In young adults, researchers have successfully demonstrated that a perspective shift 
promotes an analytic mode of thought and reduces reliance on beliefs (Beatty & Thompson, 
2012; Dias, Roazzi, & Harris, 2000; Greenhoot, Semb, Colombo, & Schreiber, 2004; Thompson 
et al., 2005). Therefore, in the present study we sought to determine if a perspective shift would 
improve reasoning in older adults. If age-related differences in reasoning abilities are, in part, 
due to a failure of older adults to fully exploit their analytic reasoning capacity, the perspective 
manipulation should be successful  (i.e., the older adults’ inclination to respond based on beliefs 
should be modulated by taking another’s perspective) and the age difference should be observed 
only when reasoning from the personal perspective. In contrast, if performance is limited by 
cognitive ability, then older adults should be impaired regardless of perspective.  
To test this hypothesis, both younger and older adults were asked to solve problems from 
their perspective and from an alternative perspective. If taking another’s perspective reduces age-
related increases in heuristic thinking, this would imply that older adults can become more 
logically capable under conditions that motivate them toward to analytic thought.  
4.1. Perspective Effect 
 Three important conclusions have emerged from studies utilizing the perspective 
manipulation. First, participants reasoning from an alternative perspective were more likely to 
approach the task logically and were better able to discern logical necessity than those who 
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reasoned from their own perspective (Thompson et al., 2005). It was proposed that reasoning 
from an alternative perspective may prompt participants to grant the truth of the premises 
(Thompson et al., 2005). Second, this manipulation appears to be effective across many groups. 
For example, the perspective manipulation has been effective a) when varied both between 
subjects (Dias et al., 2005; Thompson et al., 2005) and within subjects (Beatty & Thompson, 
2012; Greenhoot et al., 2004); b) in children (Markovits et al., 1996), unschooled adults (Dias et 
al., 2005), and university students (Beatty & Thompson, 2012; Eyal, Liberman, & Trope, 2008; 
Greenhoot et al., 2004; Thompson et al., 2005). Thus, we assumed that this manipulation had the 
potential to be effective in older adults. Finally, the perspective manipulation improves reasoning 
performance across a variety of problem types (Dias et al., 2005). These data suggest that 
switching perspectives shifts the participants into an analytic thinking style and is successful in 
many contexts. In sum, it was hypothesized that adopting another’s perspective would encourage 
T2 thinking in both young and old adults (assuming that they have to the capacity to do so), and 
improve performance for both conflict and no-conflict problems.  
4.2. Conflict Detection 
 In addition to determining whether the perspective manipulation will improve 
performance, we were also interested in determining how a perspective manipulation affects 
conflict detection. If reasoning from another’s perspective invokes analytic thinking, it is 
reasonable to assume that this may also bring awareness to the conflict between belief and logic 
on conflict problems. Based on the rationale that lower confidence on conflict problems 
compared to no-conflict problems is related to conflict detection (De Neys et al., 2011), we 
utilized a subjective assessment of confidence as a proxy for conflict detection, which was 
consistent with the design in Chapter 2. It was anticipated that if conflict was detected, 
confidence would be lower for the conflict problems than for the no-conflict problems. 
Furthermore, if the perspective manipulation aids in this awareness, it was predicted that there 
would be a larger difference between conflict and no-conflict problems for the alternative 
perspective than for the personal perspective.  
4.3. Perceived Difficulty 
We also measured reasoners perceived difficulty of the task. Consistent with the results 
from Chapter 2, it was hypothesized that the more difficult the task was perceived to be, the 
lower performance (i.e., accuracy) would be.  
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4.4. Thinking Dispositions 
 The final goal of this chapter was to examine the role of thinking dispositions in the 
likelihood of adopting another’s perspective. It is well documented that both the characteristics 
of the task and individual differences (e.g., intelligence and thinking style) play an important role 
in performance on reasoning tasks (Klaczynski, Gordon, & Fauth, 1997; Sa, West, & Stanovich, 
1999; Stanovich & West, 1997). In Chapter 2, we discussed and provided support for the model 
recently proposed by Stanovich (2009) that separates the analytic system of thinking (based on 
these individual differences) into two components, algorithmic and reflective processes. It is this 
latter component that is thought to trigger the override of the heuristic system output. Thinking 
dispositions were measured using the Actively-Open Minded Thinking scale (AOT; Stanovich et 
al., 1997, 2007, 2008), which measures the preference for analytic versus heuristic thinking. If 
there is a relationship between thinking dispositions and the perspective manipulation, it would 
suggest that a factor other than capacity is the limiting factor in engaging in T2 thinking.  If this 
is the case, those with lower AOT scores would be less likely to switch thinking styles and 
override their beliefs when reasoning from the writer’s perspective, than when reasoning from 
their own perspective.  
 
4.5. Method 
4.5.1. Participants 
 The same seventy-two younger adults (46 female) (M = 24.6 years; SD = 7.54) and 
seventy-two older adults (55 female) (M = 80.0 years, SD = 7.28) from Chapter 2 were analyzed 
in this chapter
12
.   
4.5.2. Materials 
 Participants completed eight syllogistic reasoning problems (from one of two different 
sets), once from their perspective and once from the writer’s perspective (for a total of 16 
problems) (Appendix D) using E-Prime. Each problem consisted of two premises and three 
possible conclusions. The problems were either of the form All A are B, All C are B or the form 
All B are A, All C are B, with a conclusion relating A and C. There were 4 versions of each 
form. The premises were presented as statements that had appeared in a recent newspaper (i.e., A 
                                                 
12
  Again, these participants were above average and thus, the sample is not representative of the average young or 
older adult.  
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writer states that:…). Content was assigned to the A, B, and C terms in the following manner: A 
and C referred to a familiar category (e.g., roses and flowers) and the B term referred to a non-
word (e.g., gebbers). Inclusion of a non-word limits the believability of the premises, which has 
been shown to influence performance (Thompson, 1996). Each premise set was followed by 
three conclusions: determinate in the form A are C, determinate in the form A are not C, and 
indeterminate in the form A may or may not be C. The following is an example taken from our 
stimulus set: 
All things with gebbers are flowers. Roses have gebbers. 
a) Roses are flowers 
b) Roses are not flowers 
c) Roses may or may not be flowers 
 
Each set of eight problems contained four valid problems and four invalid problems, two 
out of the eight valid conclusions coincided with the believability of the conclusion (i.e., two 
problems were no-conflict and 6 were conflict problems). The eight problems were presented 
twice to participants in immediate succession. Following the first presentation reasoners were 
asked “Do you believe it follows that…”, which prompted reasoners to provide a response from 
their own perspective. Following the second presentation of the premises, they were asked 
“According to the writer’s statement...,”, prompting them to make a judgement from an 
alternative perspective. These presentations were made on consecutive separate screens. They 
received the following instructions, which were adapted from Thompson  et al. (2005). 
 
You are going to see eight reasoning problems. The problems represent a statement that 
appeared in a recent newspaper. You will be asked to evaluate the statements from two 
perspectives: from the perspective of the writer and from your own perspective. Do not 
be concerned if some of the terms in some of the problems seem unfamiliar to you.  
When evaluating the statements from the perspective of the writer, please select a 
conclusion based on your interpretation of the writer’s intended meaning (i.e., what do 
you think that the writer of this statement meant to convey?) When evaluating the 
statements from your own perspective, please select a conclusion based on your 
interpretation of premises (i.e., what do you believe to follow from the statements?) 
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Problems were presented in a different random order for each participant; however, 
consistent with previous methodology (Thompson et al., 2005), participants made a judgement 
from their own perspective first
13
. The assignment of the two problem sets was counterbalanced, 
such that half of the participants in each age group saw the first set and the other half saw the 
second set.  
4.5.3. Confidence Judgements. For all three reasoning tasks, following each response, 
participants were asked to rate the confidence in the correctness of their judgement on the 
following scale: How confident are you that your answer is correct? 
0%     10%     20%     30%     40%     50%     60%     70%     80%     90%     100% 
   Not at all                                                  Moderately                                               Extremely 
 After solving all of the problems for the syllogistic and base rate tasks, reasoners were 
asked additional questions.  
1) You have just completed 8 problems.  Of these 8 answers, how many do you believe you 
answered correctly?   
2) On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 corresponding to extremely easy and 10 corresponding to 
extremely difficult, please evaluate the difficulty of the reasoning task that you just 
completed. 
 
4.5.4. Procedure. The procedure was described in Chapter 2 (see p.17 in Chapter 2). This 
task was presented and counterbalanced within the computer based tasks.  
 
4.6. Results 
The results were analysed in several sections. First, to test the hypothesis that adopting 
another’s perspective would improve performance for the older adults, we ran 2 (perspective: 
writer, own) x 2 (problem: conflict, no-conflict) x 2 (age group) mixed-factors ANOVA on the 
accuracy data. Second, we ran a similar analysis for the confidence data, to examine whether 
confidence values vary as a function of perspective and whether the data indicate that reasoners 
were sensitive to the conflict between logic and belief. Third, we report the results of the AOT 
and finally, we discuss the relationship between perceived task difficulty and performance and 
whether the factors in Chapter 2 (i.e., education, verbal ability, working memory, processing 
                                                 
13
 Our manipulation was within subjects, but has also been successful as a between subjects manipulation.  
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speed, inhibition, and age) predict successful perspective switching (i.e., ability to override 
intuitive responses).  
4.6.1. Performance. For performance, a response was scored as correct when reasoners 
chose the correct determinate responses (i.e., A are C or A are not C) for the valid problems or 
the indeterminate option (i.e., A may or may not be C) for invalid conclusions. Results are 
reported in Figure 4.1. Older adults were less accurate (M = .44) than young adults (M = .57), F 
(1, 142) = 17.29, MSE = .134, p < .001, ηp
2
 = .109. Reasoning from the writer’s perspective did 
not improve accuracy overall (M = .50) compared to reasoning from one’s own perspective (M = 
.51), F (1, 142) = .30, MSE = .037, p = .587, ηp
2
 = .002. There was an interaction of perspective 
with age group, F (1, 142) = 8.02, MSE = .023, p = .005, ηp
2
 = .053. Young adults were impaired 
by the perspective manipulation: their accuracy decreased from .59 to .54, when they switched to 
the writer’s perspective, t (71) = -2.21, SE = .024, p = .030. However, it appears older adults 
benefited, to an extent, from the perspective manipulation: they had a marginal increase from .42 
to .46, t (71) = 1.77, SE = .021, p = .081.  
 Consistent with prior findings (see Chapter 2), reasoners were more accurate on no-
conflict problems (M = .60) than on conflict problems (M = .41), F (1, 142) = 93.33, MSE = .057, 
p < .001, ηp
2
 = .397. There was also an interaction between perspective and problem type, F (1, 
142) = 9.34, MSE = .027, p = .003, ηp
2
 = .062. Specifically, there was no difference on conflict 
problems between the writer (.44) and one’s own perspective (.39) [t (71) = 1.47, SE = .022, p = 
.144], but for no-conflict problems there was a decrease in performance from one’s own 
perspective (.63) to the writer’s perspective (.57) [t (71) = -2.52, SE = .020, p = .013].  There was 
no evidence for an interaction between problem type and group [F (1, 142) = 2.45, MSE = .057, 
p = .119, ηp
2
 = .017]. Nonetheless, the perspective manipulation affected only conflict problems 
in older adults [performance increased when switching perspectives from .28 to .37, t (71) = 
2.96, SE = .029, p= .004] and there was no difference for the no-conflict problems [.56 to .55, t 
(71) = -.552, SE = .025, p = .583]. In contrast, for younger participants, performance did not vary 
on conflict problems when switching perspectives [.50 to .48, t (71) = -.63, SE = .033, p= .531] 
and there was a decrease for the no-conflict problems [.69 to .60, t (71) = -2.84, SE = .031, p = 
.006]. 
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Figure 4.1. Proportion of Correct Responses as a Function of Perspective, Problem, and 
                   Age.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Error bars represent the standard error. 
 
7.6.2. Confidence. Confidence data for young and older adults as a function of 
perspective and problem type are plotted in Figure 4.2. Reasoners were more confident when 
reasoning from their own perspective (M = 81.76) than when reasoning from the writer’s 
perspective (M = 79.96), F (1, 142) = 9.85, MSE = 47.58, p = .002, ηp
2
 = .065. There were no 
differences in confidence between young (M = 81.98) and older adults (M = 79.74), F (1, 142) = 
.65, MSE = 1107.78, p = .420, ηp
2
 = .005. Also, there was no difference in confidence for the 
conflict compared to the no-conflict problems, F (1, 142) = .16, MSE = 57.40, p = .689, ηp
2
 = 
.001; however, problem type did interact with perspective, F (1, 142) = 7.45, MSE = 19.18, p = 
.007, ηp
2
 = .050. On the no-conflict problems, a change in perspective, from their own 
perspective (82.13) to the writer’s perspective (79.33) decreased confidence, t (143) = -3.83, SE 
= .73, p < .001. Reasoners were equally confident (80.58 for their own to 81.39 for the writer) on 
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the conflict problems, t (143) = 1.06, SE = .62, p = .198. No other interactions were significant, F 
≤ 1.58, p ≥ .211.  
 
Figure 4.2. Confidence Scores as a Function of Perspective, Problem, and Age.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Error bars represent the standard error. 
 
4.6.3. Thinking Dispositions. To examine the relationship between the perspective 
manipulation and thinking style, we computed a perspective index for the impact of the 
perspective manipulation on accuracy and accuracy broken down by each problem type. The 
performance index score was computed by subtracting the number of conclusions correct from 
the writer’s perspective from the number correct from their own perspective. A positive 
difference or no difference indicates that the perspective manipulation did not promote 
successful analytic thinking (i.e., overriding heuristic system output). These indices were then 
correlated with the AOT scores to test our hypothesis that participants with lower AOT scores 
would be less likely to demonstrate an increase in performance when reasoning from another’s 
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perspective. Contrary to this hypothesis there were no significant correlations with the AOT, r = 
-.080, p = .344. Neither of the problem type perspective indices were correlated with AOT scores 
[conflict, r = .102, p = .227 and no-conflict, r = .016, p = .848]. This suggests that the 
perspective manipulation was equally effective for individuals with high and low AOT scores.   
4.6.4. Predictors of Successful Perspective Switching. Regression analyses were 
conducted for the perspective manipulation with the predictors from Chapter 2. All variables 
were entered in one multiple regression because there is no prior research to suggest a 
hierarchical regression. The dependent variable for this regression was the perspective index for 
accuracy discussed above. The regression equation was not significant, R
2
 = .085, F (7, 137) = 
1.72, p = .109. Thus, the individual factors examined in Chapter 2 do not predict a tendency to 
successfully engage the analytic system (i.e., by providing the correct response) when adopting 
another perspective.  
4.6.5. Perceived Difficulty. Older adults judged this task to be more difficult (M = 6.85) 
than young adults (M = 5.72), t (142) = 2.94, SE = .38, p = .004. However, unlike the syllogistic 
and base rate tasks, perceived difficulty was not related to performance when reasoning from the 
writer’s perspective, r = .087, p = .297 or from one’s own perspective, r = .026, p = .757.   
 
4.7. Discussion 
We have provided promising evidence that a simple manipulation may eliminate some of 
the reliance on intuitive responding found in older adults. When asked to reason from an 
alternative perspective, older adults showed a marginal improvement in their performance (a 
medium sized effect of 0.11). This implies that although there is a decrease in capacity 
contributing to a difference in performance with age (Chapter 2), some of the difference may be 
countered by asking older adults to reason from an alternative viewpoint. These results provide 
evidence for an additional component in the model of dual-process theory of reasoning and aging 
discussed in the former chapters. Specifically, there is evidence to suggest that some of the age-
related difference in reasoning may be related to a preference to respond based on heuristic 
outputs versus outputs of the analytic system (i.e., a failure of older adults to fully exploit T2 
capacity). 
In addition, the data also show that this performance increase for older adults was 
restricted to conflict problems. Thus, the older adults’ performance was consistent with the 
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hypothesis that adopting another’s perspective can shift thinking into an analytic style and 
consequently may encourage reasoners to temporarily abandon T1 response tendencies. 
Although, it is well known that people are often reluctant to relinquish beliefs (e.g., Evans, 
Newstead, Allen, & Pollard, 1994; Klahr & Dunbar, 1988; Klayman & Ha, 1987; Kuhn, Amsel, 
O’Loughlin, 1988; Newstead, Pollard, Evans, & Allen, 1992; Schauble, 1996), we have 
successfully demonstrated older adults are able to do so, to a degree, when reasoning from 
another perspective.  
 In contrast, however, young adults did not benefit from the shift in perspective. One 
explanation for the difference between groups is that young and older adults interpreted the 
perspective manipulation differently. Specifically, it is possible that the young adults may have 
interpreted the instruction to adopt the writer’s perspective to mean that the writer would endorse 
the conclusion that is given because it was the writer who advanced it. This would increase the 
probability of accepting the conclusion. Indeed, we found that young adults accepted more 
conclusions (chose a determinate response more often than an indeterminate response) from the 
writer’s perspective than from their own perspective. This was not the case for the older adults, 
for whom the perspective switch appeared to induce a more logical, analytic approach. An 
alternative explanation is that the perspective manipulation encouraged both groups to alter their 
personal perspective (which always occurred first).  The response given in the personal 
perspective was less likely to be accurate for older than  younger adults; thus, changing the 
response provided for the personal perspective would result in younger adults’ performance 
decreasing and older adults’ performance increasing. 
 Other perspective manipulations have also been effective in inducing analytic thinking. 
For example, asking participants to think about events occurring in the distant future has 
increased analytic thinking in younger adults (Eyal et al., 2008). It is believed that this is 
effective because representations can be made more abstract by distancing them from direct 
experience. An additional manipulation garnering similar results, was completed by Dias and 
colleagues (2005), who had unschooled adults think about the premises as true on a different 
planet. These manipulations could also be examined to determine the generalizability of these 
results.  
 For both age groups, performance on conflict problems was lower than that for the no-
conflict problems, which is consistent with the findings from the syllogistic and base rate tasks 
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(Chapter 2).  For the present task, there was no evidence that either age group was sensitive to 
the conflict between logic and belief; given that there were no differences in the confidence 
ratings for the two types of problems. Furthermore, switching perspectives did not appear to 
increase awareness of the conflict, because there were no differences between problem types in 
either perspective.  
  Finally, we also wanted to determine whether thinking dispositions would predict 
success in adopting another’s perspective. It was predicted that AOT would be related to 
effective perspective switching, such that low AOT scorers would be less likely to successfully 
adopt another’s perspective. However, there was no relationship between AOT scores and 
reasoning analytically from another’s perspective. Although prior research has found a 
relationship between AOT and different response strategies in a perspective task (Beatty & 
Thompson, 2012), the current task is quite different than the task employed in other research (i.e. 
argument evaluation task) and perhaps a task of this nature requires a different type of thinking 
style. Furthermore, this task is challenging and similar to the syllogistic task utilized in Chapter 
2, in which performance was also unrelated to AOT scores. Again, it is possible that this task 
requires mindware (Stanovich, 2009) to reason effectively, and that many of the participants lack 
this. Thus, even if reasoners have a predisposition to engage in analytic thinking (higher scores 
on the AOT), they may lack the mindware necessary to override their initial intuitive response. 
To examine this possibility, researchers could gather information on basic comprehension of the 
problem (e.g., having participants provide a step-by-step approach to solving the problems) and 
relevant skills (e.g., training in standard logic) held by the participants or increase basic 
comprehension (e.g., through training the participants; Prowse Turner & Thompson, 2009) 
4.7.1. Conclusions. We have provided evidence to indicate that a simple intervention, 
that of adopting an objective perspective, can decrease older adults’ reliance on intuitive 
responses to some extent. Indeed, it appears possible that older adults can engage in additional 
T2 processing when motivated to adopt an alternative perspective. These results suggest that a 
portion of the age-related differences in reasoning may be attributed to a failure to exploit 
available T2 processing resources. That is, although some of the variance in reasoning 
performance can be attributed to differences in algorithmic capacity, additional variance may be 
explained by propensity to engage in heuristic rather than analytic thought. Furthermore, it is 
possible that this is a strategy employed by the older adults to conserve cognitive resources. 
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Thus, the age-related difference in reasoning may be mediated by the use of strategies that 
maximise the use of available T2 resources. These results further the dual-process theory of 
reasoning and aging by demonstrating that some of the age-related reasoning differences may be 
attributed to a strategy choice.   
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Chapter 5 
General Conclusions 
The objective of the current dissertation was to develop and test a dual-process account of 
age-related differences in reasoning ability. Previous research in this field has implicated 
cognitive capacity as a major contributor to these differences; however, it was not evident that 
capacity attenuates the age-related difference in performance. In addition to cognitive capacity, 
dual-process theory posits additional factors that could mediate age-related declines in reasoning. 
Consistent with this view, it was demonstrated here that both the algorithmic and reflective 
components of the analytic system contribute to differences in reasoning performance between 
young and old adults, along with strategic use of available Type 2 resources. Surprisingly we 
found few differences in metacognitive processes between old and young adults, so that 
metacognitive processes cannot explain differences in reasoning ability among the two groups. 
As the following summary shows, this body of research suggests that a dual-process approach to 
effects of age on reasoning provides an integrative account for the results obtained both in the 
current dissertation, and previously.  
Young adults outperformed the older adults on all four reasoning tasks, the syllogistic, 
base rate, CRT, and perspective tasks. Older adults were at a disadvantage when they needed to 
engage the analytic system; however they performed on par with the young adults when 
decisions could be based on beliefs or stereotypes, which is consistent with prior research (De 
Neys & Van Gelder, 2009). Specifically, the dual-process approach allowed us to explain both 
aspects of reasoning that remain stable (e.g., reliance on beliefs) and those that are sensitive to 
age effects (e.g., individual capacity factors). The data confirm that older adults have trouble 
shifting from heuristic to analytic processing and that this may be due to a combination of 
processing capacity limitations, education, belief bias, thinking style, and strategy choice. 
The data indicate that some of these differences may be related to educational differences 
between older and young participants; although our older adults were above average in their 
level of education, older adults had a lower level of education than the young adults, and 
education contributed to unique variance in two of the three tasks. There was also evidence that 
actively open-minded thinking is related to performance, at least on the base rate task. The 
relationship between the AOT and performance on the syllogistic task was marginal, and the 
relationship between the AOT and performance on the CRT was non-significant. Although the 
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AOT measures a preference for reflective thinking, there are other factors important in whether 
reasoners will override the initial T1 response. First, reasoners need to possess the mindware, 
that is, the knowledge of logical rules (Stanovich, 2009), to realize their beliefs are in conflict 
with the logical rules of the task. Due to the difficult and unfamiliar nature of the syllogistic task, 
the necessary mindware may be absent. Evidence for this argument can be gained by examining 
the relationship between perceived difficulty and conflict detection. The difficulty ratings for the 
perspective task fell between the ratings for the syllogistic task and the base rate task, but were 
on the higher end of the scale; however, in both the syllogistic and perspective tasks, there was 
little evidence to suggest reasoners were sensitive to conflict, whereas reasoners were sensitive to 
conflict in the base rate task. As the perceived difficulty of the task increased, the ability to 
detect conflict decreased, and also the length of time to respond increased, which suggests that 
longer time may be related to analytic engagement, but there are other components necessary for 
successful execution of T2 thinking.  
Second, reasoners need a cue to override the T1 response. If reasoners have a strong 
feeling of rightness (i.e., a metacognitive experience, which can signal when additional analysis 
is needed; Thompson, 2009; Thompson et al., 2011) in the initial response, it is unlikely that the 
response will be re-examined. The questions in the CRT are believed to be answered with a 
strong feeling of rightness (Frederick, 2005), thus the cue to rethinking the initial response may 
be absent in the CRT, especially for the older adults. Overall, these results provide evidence that 
limits to algorithmic capacity are related to age-related differences, but also provide evidence 
that, at least some of the difference is related to individual differences in the reflective level as 
well.  
 In Chapter 3, we found that although young and old adults frequently gave a belief-or 
stereotyped response to conflict problems (older adults to a greater extent), there was evidence 
that the conflict was detected, at least on the base rate task. With regard to the syllogistic task, 
there was little evidence to suggest that reasoners detected the conflict; however, participants 
appeared to be aware when they provided a correct versus an incorrect response. In the base rate 
task, the confidence and response time data suggest that young adults detected conflict, which is 
consistent with prior research (De Neys, Cromheeke, & Osman, 2011; De Neys & Franssens, 
2009). The confidence data for the older adults suggests that older adults also noticed the 
conflict. There was no corresponding effect on RT, perhaps because their relatively slow and 
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more variable processing speeds made response time a relatively insensitive measure of conflict 
detection.   
It is also clear that belief information in the problems (i.e., believability of the conclusion 
or stereotypical information) is a strong cue to confidence and that without belief information 
(for example on neutral problems), reasoners slow down and report lower confidence, which is 
demonstrating that belief adds a level of certainty to their judgements. Results were also 
consistent with the conclusion that latency was a cue to confidence, the longer reasoners took to 
solve the problem, and the less confident they were. It was also demonstrated that perceived task 
difficulty was related to performance and latency, reasoners spent more time on tasks they 
perceived to be difficult, however this increase in time does not translate into better performance.  
Promising results were also revealed in Chapter 4, suggesting that older adults may be 
able to counter some of the difference on conflict problems by reasoning from another 
perspective. Although this manipulation was not effective for the young adults, it is possible that 
they interpreted this task differently than the older adults. Also, the older adults started from a 
lower baseline level in the self-perspective condition, providing greater opportunities to benefit 
from the switch to the writer’s perspective.  
5.1. Limitations. As we have stated previously, our older adults were above average for 
their age on a number of cognitive measures. This raises the possibility that the present data 
underestimate the average age-related difference in reasoning and potentially overestimate the 
typical benefit that switching to an objective perspective provides. However, it is also the most 
optimistic view we can give of age-related differences in reasoning performance. The number of 
tasks given to the older adults in a single session may have also been quite taxing. One way to 
ensure that the data are a result of difference and not fatigue, would be to replicate these results 
by testing participants in multiple sessions or by examining some of these effects between 
subjects.  
Also, whereas other studies have included multiple measures of working memory (e.g. 
Levitt, Fugelsang, & Crossley, 2006; Salthouse, 2005) to create a single composite score that 
might be a more reliable measure of capacity, in the current study we chose take only a single 
measure of working memory capacity. First, working memory tasks are taxing for participants, 
especially for older adults, and as above, we were already concerned about fatigue effects. 
Second, we were able to use the List Span Task (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; De Beni, 
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Palladino, Pazzaglia, & Cornoldi, 1998), which has been argued to be a comprehensive and 
reliable measure (Morrison, 2005).  However, to ensure the generalizability of our findings, it 
may be beneficial to measure working memory in this manner to provide further support for the 
current conclusions.  
5.2. Future directions. There is still residual age-related variance that needs to be 
explained. One avenue would be to explore the relationship between the availability of mindware 
and the ability to successfully override the intuitive response with a Type 2-based response 
(Stanovich, 2009). As defined by Stanovich (see 2009 for review), mindware is the “rules, 
procedures, and strategies that can be retrieved by the analytic system and used to transform 
decoupled representation” (p. 71).  
Further examination of this concept may also provide information for the marginal effect 
of AOT scores on the syllogistic task. In particular, reasoners may demonstrate a preference for 
analytic thinking (high scores on AOT) and have high capacity scores, but lack the mindware to 
execute successful Type 2 engagement. Thus, while these reasoners may have perceived the need 
for additional analytic thought, they may not have knowledge necessary to execute the 
appropriate rules and procedures. In other words, the fact that reasoners have high AOT scores 
does not mean that they have good mindware. Examination of the relationship between AOT 
scores and mindware will provide a test of this hypothesis.  
To examine the null relationship between the CRT and the AOT scores, one could test the 
hypothesis that the questions on the CRT have a strong feeling of rightness, thus not providing 
reasoners with a cue to rethink the initial response. By employing a two response paradigm 
(Thompson et al., 2011; 2012), where reasoners are instructed to provide an initial response 
along with a feeling of rightness, before they are allowed as much time necessary to reconsider 
the response, we will get a better picture of the degree to which these problems are compelling, 
and why, this compelling response is a stronger cue than preference for analytic thinking.  
5.3. Conclusions. The present findings advanced the literature of reasoning and aging in 
several ways: 1) by providing an integrative model to account for the current findings in multiple 
research domains, 2) by demonstrating that the age related differences in reasoning is restricted 
to problems that require analytic engagement, 3) by demonstrating that detection of the conflict 
between belief and logic differs by task, 4) by providing evidence that the difference is related to 
a combination of individual difference factors (algorithmic and reflective processes), and 
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strategy choice, 5) by demonstrating that age-related differences cannot, at this time, be 
explained by metacognitive differences between young and older adults, and 6) by identifying a 
simple intervention that may reduce the effects of this difference.  
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Appendix A 
 
Problems in the Syllogistic Task 
 
Conflict Problems 
No addictive things are ramadions 
Some cigarettes are ramadions 
Therefore, some cigarettes are not addictive 
things                           (Valid-Unbelievable) 
Some vitamin tablets are opprobines 
No nutritional things are opprobines   
Therefore, some nutritional things are not 
vitamin tablets               (Invalid-Believable) 
 
Some astronauts are Lapitars 
No healthy people are Lapitars 
Therefore, some astronauts are not healthy 
people                          (Valid-Unbelievable) 
No well-educated people are Pennes   
Some judges are Pennes 
Therefore, some well-educated people are not 
judges                             (Invalid-Believable) 
No-Conflict Problems 
No police dogs are argonelles 
Some highly trained dogs are argonelles 
Therefore, some highly trained dogs are not 
police dogs                    (Valid-Believable) 
Some rich people are Hudons 
No millionaires are Hudons 
Therefore, some millionaires are not rich  
people                           (Invalid-Unbelievable) 
 
Some religious people are Selaciens  
No priests are Selaciens  
Therefore, some religious people are not 
priests                            (Valid-Believable) 
No deep sea divers are Sylvians 
Some good swimmers are Sylvians 
Therefore, some deep sea divers are not 
good swimmers           (Invalid-Unbelievable) 
Neutral Problems 
No Welps are lawyers 
Some Abens are lawyers 
Therefore, some Abens are not Welps 
                                                 (Valid-Neutral) 
Some Delpads are bird watchers 
No Furels are bird watchers 
Therefore, some Furels are not Delpads 
                                                (Invalid-Neutral) 
Some Rewons are bus drivers 
No Likels are bus drivers 
Therefore, some Rewons are not Likels 
                                                 (Valid-Neutral) 
No Mobbes are teachers 
Some Plicks are teachers 
Therefore, some Mobbes are not Plicks 
                                               (Invalid-Neutral) 
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Appendix B 
Example Base Rate Problems 
Conflict Problem 
(a) In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 4 men and 996 
women. Jo is a randomly chosen participant of this study.  Jo is 23 years old and is finishing a 
degree in engineering. On Friday nights, Jo likes to go out cruising with friends while listening to 
loud music and drinking beer. 
What is most likely? 
a. Jo is a man b. Jo is a woman 
 
No-Conflict Problem 
(a) In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 995 who buy their 
clothes at high-end retailers and five who buy their clothes at Wal-Mart. Karen is a randomly 
chosen participant of this study. Karen is a 33-year-old female. She works in a business office 
and drives a Porsche. She lives in a fancy penthouse with her boyfriend. 
What is most likely? 
a. Karen buys her clothes at high end retailers  b. Karen buys her clothes at Wal-Mart 
 
Neutral problem 
(a) In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were five who campaigned 
for George W. Bush and 995 who campaigned for John Kerry. Jim is a randomly chosen 
participant of this study.  Jim is 5 ft and 8 in. tall, has black hair, and is the father of two young 
girls. He drives a yellow van that is completely covered with posters. 
What is most likely? 
a. Jim campaigned for George W. Bush   b. Jim campaigned for John Kerry 
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Appendix C 
 
The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) 
 
(1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs a dollar more than the ball. How much does 
the ball cost?    ____ cents 
 
(2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to 
make 100 widgets?   ____ minutes 
 
(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days 
for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the 
lake?   ____ days 
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Appendix D 
Perspective Stimuli 
Set 1 Premises Set 2 Premises Conclusions  
All things with gebbers are 
flowers. Roses have gebbers. 
 
All flowers are things with 
gebbers. Roses have gebbers. 
 
a) Roses are flowers 
b) Roses are not flowers 
c) Roses may or may not 
be flowers 
A writer states that: All gottuses 
are alive. Televisions are not 
gottuses. 
All things that are alive are 
gottuses. Televisions are not 
gottuses. 
 
a) Televisions are alive 
b) Televisions are not alive 
c) Televisions may or may 
not be alive 
All things that have emblers are 
animals. Cats do not have 
emblers. 
 
All animals have emblers. 
Cats do not have emblers. 
 
a) Cats are animals 
b) Cats are not animals 
c) Cats may or may not be 
animals 
All things that have zabs can 
walk. Whales have zabs. 
 
 
All things that can walk have 
zabs. Whales have zabs. 
 
a) Whales can walk  
b) Whales can not walk 
c) Whales may or may not 
be able to walk 
All communist countries have a 
nima. Canada does not have a 
nima. 
 
All countries that have a nima 
are communist countries. 
Canada does not have a nima. 
 
a) Canada is a communist 
country 
b) Canada is not a 
communist country 
c) Canada may or may not 
be a communist country 
All things that have motors 
have a frimjam. Automobiles 
have a frimjam. 
All things that have a frimjam 
have motors. Automobiles 
have a frimjam. 
 
a) Automobiles have 
motors 
b) Automobiles do not 
have motors 
c) Automobiles may or 
may not have motors 
All large mammals metabolize 
mimus. Mice metabolize 
mimus. 
 
All things that metabolize 
mimus are large things. Mice 
metabolize mimus. 
 
a) Mice are large 
mammals 
b) Mice are not large 
mammals 
c) Mice may or may not be 
large mammals 
All animals with four legs have 
the protein brox in their blood. 
Poodles do not have the protein 
brox in their blood. 
All things that have the 
protein brox in their blood are 
animals with four legs. 
Poodles do not have the 
protein brox in their blood. 
 
a) Poodles have four legs 
b) Poodles do not have 
four legs 
c) Poodles may or may not 
have four legs 
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Appendix E 
 
METAMEMORY IN ADULTHOOD 
Metamemory in Adulthood used with permission Dixon, R. A. & Hultsch, D. F. ©1983 
 
Date: _______ / _______ / _______  Participant # _____________________ 
 d  m  y    
     Scorer’s Initials: __________________ 
 
MEMORY QUESTIONNAIRE 
Directions 
Different people use their memory in different ways in their everyday lives. For example, 
some people make shopping lists, whereas others do not. Some people are good at remembering 
names, whereas others are not. 
 
In this questionnaire, we would like you to tell us how you use your memory and how 
you feel about it. There are no right or wrong answers to these questions because people are 
different. Please take your time and answer each of these questions to the best of your ability. 
 
Each question is followed by five choices. Draw a circle around the letter corresponding 
to your choice. Mark only one letter for each statement. 
 
Some of the questions ask your opinion about memory-related statements; for example: 
________________________________________________________________________ 
My memory will get worse as I get older.  a. agree strongly 
b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In this example you could, of course, choose any one of the answers. If you agree strongly with 
the statement you would circle a. If you disagree strongly you would circle letter e. The b and d 
answers indicate less strong agreement or disagreement. The letter c answer gives you a middle 
choice, but don't use the c unless you really can't decide on any of the other responses. 
Some of the questions ask how often you do certain things that may be related to your 
memory. For example: 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Do you make a list of things to a. never 
be accomplished during the day?  b. rarely 
c. sometimes 
d. often 
e. always 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Again, you could choose any one of the answers. Choose the one that comes closest to 
what you usually do. Don't worry if the time estimate is not exact, or if there are some 
exceptions. 
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Keep these points in mind: 
(a) Answer every question, even if it doesn't seem to apply to you very well. 
(b) Answer as honestly as you can what is true for you. Please do not mark something because it 
seems like the "right thing to say." 
________________________________________________________________________ 
1.  For most people, facts that are  a. agree strongly 
interesting are easier to remember b. agree 
than facts that are not. c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
2.  I am good at remembering  a. agree strongly 
 names.  b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
3. Do you keep a list or  a. never 
otherwise note important  b. rarely 
dates, such as birthdays  c. sometimes 
and anniversaries?  d. often 
 e. always 
________________________________________________________________________ 
4. It is important to me to  a. agree strongly 
 have a good memory.  b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
5. I get upset when I cannot remember a. agree strongly 
 something. b. agree  
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
6. When you are looking for something you a. never 
have recently misplaced, do you try to b. rarely 
 retrace your steps in order to locate it? c. sometimes 
d. often 
e. always 
________________________________________________________________________ 
7. I think a good memory is something of a. agree strongly 
 which to be proud. b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
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______________________________________________________________________ 
8. I find it harder to remember things a. agree strongly 
 when I am upset. b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
9. I am good at remembering birth a. agree strongly 
 dates.  b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
10. I can remember things as well as a. agree strongly 
 always. b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
11. When you have not finished a. never 
 reading a book or magazine, do  b. rarely 
 you somehow note the place where  c. sometimes 
 you have stopped?  d. often 
 e. always 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
12. I get anxious when I am asked to a. agree strongly 
 remember something. b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
13. It bothers me when others notice a. agree strongly 
 my memory failures.  b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
14. I'm less efficient at remembering a. agree strongly 
 things now than I used to be. b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
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15. I have difficulty remembering things a. agree strongly 
 when I am anxious. b. agree  
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
16. The older I get the harder it is to a. agree strongly 
 remember clearly. b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
17. Do you think about the day's a. never 
 activities at the beginning of the b. rarely 
 day so you can remember what c. sometimes 
 you are supposed to do? d. often 
 e. always 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
18. I am just as good at remembering a. agree strongly 
 as I ever was. b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
19. I have no trouble keeping track of a. agree strongly 
 my appointments. b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
20. For most people, it is easier to a. agree strongly 
 remember information they need to b. agree 
 use immediately than information c. undecided 
 they will not use for a long time. d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
21. Most people find it easier to a. agree strongly 
 remember directions to places they b. agree 
 want or need to go than to places c. undecided 
 they know they will never be going. d. disagree 
 e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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22. I am usually uneasy when I attempt a. agree strongly 
 a problem that requires me to use b. agree 
 my memory. c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
23. I feel jittery if I have to introduce a. agree strongly 
 someone I just met. b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
24. Having a better memory would be a. agree strongly 
 nice but it is not very important. b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
25. Do you post reminders of things a. never 
 you need to do in a prominent b. rarely 
 place, such as bulletin boards or c. sometimes 
 note boards? d. often 
 e. always 
________________________________________________________________________ 
26. It doesn't bother me when my a. agree strongly 
 memory fails. b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
27. I am poor at remembering trivia.  a. agree strongly 
b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
28. I am much worse now at a. agree strongly 
 remembering the content of news b. agree 
 articles and broadcasts than I was c. undecided 
 10 years ago. d. disagree 
 e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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29. Do you routinely keep things in a a. never 
 familiar spot so you won't forget b. rarely 
 them when you need to locate c. sometimes 
 them? d. often 
 e. always 
________________________________________________________________________ 
30. Compared to 10 years ago, I am a. agree strongly 
 much worse at remembering titles b. agree 
 of books, films, or plays. c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
31. For most people it is easier to a. agree strongly 
 remember words they want to use b. agree 
 than words they know they will c. undecided 
 never use. d. disagree 
 e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
32. I remember my dreams much less a. agree strongly 
 now than 10 years ago. b. agree 
  c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
33. I can't expect to be good at a. agree strongly 
 remembering postal codes at my b. agree 
 age. c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
34. Most people find it easier to a. agree strongly 
 remember the names of people b. agree 
 they especially dislike than people c. undecided 
they hardly notice. d. disagree 
 e. disagree strongly 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
35. I have little control over my memory a. agree strongly 
 ability. b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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36. When you want to take something a. never 
 with you, do you leave it in an b. rarely 
 obvious, prominent place, such as c. sometimes 
putting your suitcase in front of the d. often 
 door? e. always 
________________________________________________________________________ 
37. I think it is important to work at a. agree strongly 
 sustaining my memory abilities. b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
38. I misplace things more frequently a. agree strongly 
 now than when I was younger. b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
39. As people get older they tend to a. agree strongly 
 forget where they put things more b. agree 
 frequently. c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
40. I work hard at trying to improve my a. agree strongly 
 memory. b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
41. Compared to 10 years ago, I now a. agree strongly 
 forget many more appointments. b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
42. If I am put on the spot to remember a. agree strongly 
 names, I know I will have difficulty b. agree 
doing it. c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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43. For most people, it is easier to a. agree strongly 
 remember the names of people b. agree 
 they especially like than people that c. undecided 
don't make much of an impression d. disagree 
on them. e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
44. Most people find it easier to a. agree strongly 
 remember words they understand b. agree 
 than words that don't mean very c. undecided 
 much to them. d. disagree 
 e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
45. My memory for important events a. agree strongly 
 has improved over the last 10 b. agree 
years. c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
46. I admire people who have good a. agree strongly 
 memories. b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
47. My friends often notice my memory a. agree strongly 
 ability. b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
48. When you try to remember people a. never 
 you have met, do you associate b. rarely 
 names and faces? c. sometimes 
d. often 
e. always 
________________________________________________________________________ 
49. I am good at remembering the a. agree strongly 
order that events occurred. b. agree  
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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50. For most people, words they a. agree strongly 
 have seen or heard before are b. agree 
 easier to remember than words c. undecided 
 that are totally new to them. d. disagree 
 e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
51. Familiar things are easier to a. agree strongly 
remember than unfamiliar things. b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
52. I am good at remembering a. agree strongly 
 conversations I have had. b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
53. I would feel on edge right now if I a. agree strongly 
 had to take a memory test or b. agree 
 something similar. c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
54. My memory for phone numbers will a. agree strongly 
 decline as I get older. b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
55. I often notice my friends' memory a. agree strongly 
ability. b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
56. My memory for dates has declined a. agree strongly 
 greatly in the last 10 years. b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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57. When you have trouble a. never 
 remembering something, do you try b. rarely 
 to remember something similar in c. sometimes 
 order to help you remember? d. often 
 e. always 
________________________________________________________________________ 
58. My memory for names has a. agree strongly 
 declined greatly in the last 10 b. agree 
 years. c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
59. I often forget who was with me at a. agree strongly 
 events I have attended. b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
60. Do you consciously attempt to a. never 
 reconstruct the day's events in b. rarely 
 order to remember something? c. sometimes 
d. often 
e. always 
________________________________________________________________________ 
61. As long as I exercise my memory it a. agree strongly  
 will not decline. b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
62. I am good at remembering the a. agree strongly 
 places I have been. b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
63. I know if I keep using my memory I a. agree strongly 
 will never lose it. b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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64. Do you try to relate something you a. never 
 want to remember to something b. rarely 
 else hoping that this will increase c. sometimes 
 the likelihood of your remembering d. often 
later? e. always 
________________________________________________________________________ 
65. It's important that I am very a. agree strongly 
accurate when remembering b. agree 
 names of people. c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
66. When I am tense and uneasy at a a. agree strongly 
 social gathering I cannot remember b. agree 
 names very well. c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
67. Do you try to concentrate hard on a. never 
 something you want to remember? b. rarely 
c. sometimes 
d. often 
e. always 
________________________________________________________________________ 
68. It's important that I am very a. agree strongly 
 accurate when remembering b. agree 
 significant dates. c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
69. It's up to me to keep my a. agree strongly 
 remembering abilities from b. agree 
 deteriorating. c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
70. When someone I don't know very a. agree strongly 
 well asks me to remember b. agree  
 something I get nervous. c. undecided 
 d. disagree 
 e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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71. I have no trouble remembering a. agree strongly 
 where I have put things. b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
72. It is easier for most people to a. agree strongly 
 remember things that are unrelated b. agree 
to each other than things that are  c. undecided 
 related.  d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly  
________________________________________________________________________ 
73. Even if I work on it, my memory a. agree strongly 
ability will go downhill. b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
74. Most people find it easier to a. agree strongly 
remember concrete things than  b. agree 
 abstract things.  c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
75. Do you make mental images or a. never 
 pictures to help you remember? b. rarely 
c. sometimes 
d. often 
e. always 
________________________________________________________________________ 
76. I know of someone in my family a. agree strongly 
 whose memory improved b. agree 
 significantly in old age. c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
77. I am good at remembering things a. agree strongly 
 like recipes. b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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78. I get anxious when I have to do a. agree strongly 
 something I haven't done for a long b. agree 
 time. c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
79. It bothers me when I forget an a. agree strongly 
 appointment. b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
80. Most people find it easier to       a. agree strongly 
 remember things that happen to b. agree 
 them than things that happen to  c. undecided 
 others. d. disagree 
 e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
81. Do you mentally repeat something a. never 
 you are trying to remember? b. rarely 
c. sometimes 
d. often 
e. always 
________________________________________________________________________ 
82. My memory has improved greatly a. agree strongly 
 in the last 10 years. b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
83. I like to remember things on my a. agree strongly 
 own, without relying on other  b. agree 
 people to remind me. c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
84. I get tense and anxious when I feel  a. agree strongly  
 my memory is not as good as other  b. agree 
 peoples'.  c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
  
113 
 
85. Do you ask other people to remind a. never 
 you of something? b. rarely 
c. sometimes 
 d. often 
 e. always 
________________________________________________________________________ 
86. I'm highly motivated to remember      a. agree strongly 
 new things I learn. b. agree 
 c. undecided 
d. disagree 
 e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
87. I do not get flustered when I am put a. agree strongly 
 on the spot to remember new b. agree 
 things. c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
88. I am good at remembering titles of a. agree strongly 
 books, films, or plays. b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
89. My memory has declined greatly in  a. agree strongly 
 the last 10 years. b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
90. For most people it is easier to  a. agree strongly 
 remember things in which they are  b. agree 
most interested than things in  c. undecided 
which they are less interested.  d. disagree 
 e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
91. I have no trouble remembering  a. agree strongly 
 lyrics of songs.  b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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92. My memory will get better as I get  a. agree strongly  
 older.  b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
93. It is easier for most people to  a. agree strongly 
 remember bizarre things than usual  b. agree 
 things. c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
94. Do you write yourself reminder  a. never 
 notes?  b. rarely 
c. sometimes 
d. often 
e. always 
________________________________________________________________________ 
95. I am good at remembering names a. agree strongly 
 of musical selections.  b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
96. Most people find it easier to  a. agree strongly 
 remember visual things than verbal  b. agree 
 things.  c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
97. After I have read a book I have no  a. agree strongly 
 difficulty remembering factual  b. agree 
 information from it.  c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
98. Do you write appointments on a  a. never 
 calendar to help you remember  b. rarely 
 them?  c. sometimes 
d. often 
e. always 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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99. I would feel very anxious if I visited  a. agree strongly 
 a new place and had to remember  b. agree 
 how to find my way back.  c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
100. I am good at remembering the a. agree strongly 
 content of news articles and  b. agree 
 broadcasts.  c. undecided 
  d. disagree   
 e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
101. No matter how hard a person a. agree strongly 
 works on his memory, it cannot be b. agree 
 improved very much.  c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
102. If I were to work on my memory I  a. agree strongly 
 could improve it.  b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
103. It gives me great satisfaction to       a. agree strongly 
 remember things I thought I had  b. agree 
 forgotten.  c. undecided 
 d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
104. Remembering the plots of stories  a. agree strongly 
 and novels is easy for me.  b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
105. I am usually able to remember  a. agree strongly 
 exactly where I read or heard a  b. agree 
 specific thing.  c. undecided 
 d. disagree 
 e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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106. I think a good memory comes  a. agree strongly 
 mostly from working at it.  b. agree 
c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
107. Most people find it easier to  a. agree strongly 
 remember unorganized things than  b. agree 
 organized things.  c. undecided 
d. disagree 
e. disagree strongly 
________________________________________________________________________ 
108. Do you write shopping lists?  a. never 
b. rarely 
c. sometimes 
d. often 
e. always 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
